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U.S. PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS.

CAUSEWAY JOINT STAFF STUDY...

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AGAW-H 314.7 (11 Jun 47)

4 September 1947

Transmittal of Documents

Commandant
U. S. Armed Forces Staff College
Norfolk 11, Virginia
ATTN: Lt. Col. Charles W. Florence, Jr.

With reference to letter this office AGAW-H 314.7 dated 11 June 1947,
Subject: Transmittal of Documents, inclosed are the following ~~3~~ documents:

1. Joint Staff Study, CinCPoa - "Causeway"
2. Joint Staff Study, CinCPoa - "Longtom"

EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major General
The Adjutant General

3 Incls
1-2 As indicated
3 WD AGO Form 996

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UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

A16

Serial 0001057

2 December 1944.

From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
To : Distribution List.
Subject: CAUSEWAY Joint Staff Study - Change No. 2 to.
Reference: (a) CinCPac-CinCPOA ~~top secret~~ ser. 00078 of 21 June 1944, subject: "Joint Staff Study - CAUSEWAY Operation".
Enclosure: (A) Revised pages 73 and 74 to reference (a).

1. Revised pages 73 and 74 of reference (a) are enclosed for insertion in the Preliminary Draft of Joint Staff Study CAUSEWAY. Pages removed will be destroyed by burning. No report of destruction is required.

J. H. TOWERS
Deputy Cincpac & Cincpoa

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CHANGE PAGE 6 Revised

" " 10 "

APPENDIX "G"

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Indexed

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
Headquarters of the Commander in Chief

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Serial 000100

23 August 1944

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From: Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas.
To : Distribution List.

Subject: Changes and Supplement to CAUSEWAY Joint Staff Study.

Reference: (a) Cincpoa serial 00078 of 21 June 1944.

Enclosures: (A) Corrected pages 6 and 10 to reference (a).
(B) Appendix G to reference (a).

1. Corrected pages 6 and 10 to reference (a) are enclosed for insertion in the Preliminary Draft of Joint Staff Study of CAUSEWAY; these changes have resulted primarily from changes in STALEMATE. It will be noted that these changes introduce certain inconsistencies in Appendix C of reference (a); these will be corrected in a Revised Joint Staff Study which is expected to be issued after the conclusion of STALEMATE. Pages 6 and 10 removed from reference (a) will be destroyed by burning. No report of destruction is required.

2. Enclosure (B), Logistic Measures, is provided as Appendix G for inclusion in the Joint Staff Study of CAUSEWAY.

C. H. McMORRIS
Chief of Staff

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O. L. Thorne
O. L. THORNE
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1420 - 23 Aug 44

VI. FORCES REQUIRED

Tentative composition of major units and mounting areas follows. For details see Appendix E.

a. Ground Forces

<u>CORPS</u>	<u>PRINCIPAL TROOPS</u>	<u>MOUNTING AREAS</u>	<u>TIME OF LANDING</u>
III Amphibious Corps to FORMOSA	1st MarDiv 6th MarDiv 77th InfDiv	GUADALCANAL-RUSSELLS) GUADALCANAL-RUSSELLS) GUADALCANAL-RUSSELLS)	D day
XXIV Army Corps to FORMOSA	7th InfDiv 96th InfDiv 97th InfDiv ("A" Div)	NOUMEA) NOUMEA) HAWAII)	D day
V Amphibious Corps to AMOY	4th MarDiv 5th MarDiv 2nd MarDiv	HAWAII) HAWAII) MARIANAS)	D plus 20

Area Reserve

27th InfDiv ESPIRITU-SANTO)
86th InfDiv ("B" Div) HAWAII)

b. Garrison Air Forces

By squadrons and exclusive of aviation from other areas participating in the operation.

FORMOSA

AMOY

Army

4 VBM Medium Bombers
8 VBH Heavy "
24 VLR Very Long Range "

Navy

Navy

4 PB(HL) Patrol Bomber Heavy, LAND, 1 PB(MS) Patrol Bomber Medium
1 VD Photographic 1 VH
2 PB(MS) Patrol Bomber Medium Land Base
1 VH

Marine

Marine

9 VMF Fighters
3 VMF(N) Night Fighters
4 VMSB/VMTB Dive Bombers
4 VMR (forward ech. only) Medium Transport
6 VMF Fighters
2 VMF(N) NIGHT FIGHTERS
4 VMSB/VMTB
1 VMD (Fighter) Photo
4 VMB (ASW trained) Heavy Bomber

According to information now available the most favorable coastline for landing and rapid advance inland by large forces is between a point about six miles southeast of TOKO and HURYO (BORYO).

Information is lacking as to enemy strength and dispositions in the AMOY area.

It is assumed that guns are emplaced to defend the harbor area.

It is expected that plans for the assault upon AMOY as well as those for FORMOSA will be modified as more complete information is received.

003040

2. FORCES.

a. Assault Forces. The strength of total forces to be employed in FORMOSA is limited by the capacity of the port of TAIPEI. The major assault forces for each objective and their mounting areas are indicated under concept of operations in Part I of this study.

Units of the III Amphibious Corps will be mounted and rehearsed in the GUADALCANAL - RUSSELLS area. The V Amphibious Corps less one division will be mounted and rehearsed in the HAWAIIAN area. The 2nd Marine Division will be mounted in the MARIANAS and will be the third division of this corps. The XXIV Corps less one division will mount in NEW CALEDONIA. The "A" Division (assumed to be the 97th Infantry Division) will mount in HAWAII and move to SOPAC for rehearsals.

The tank battalions normally attached for landing operations to divisions of the XXIV Army Corps are sufficient in number to constitute the principal combat elements of a strong armored force. The necessary command, reconnaissance, supporting and service troops should be procured, moved to the SOUTH PACIFIC and given preliminary training with the tank

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CAUSEWAY
APPENDIX G
LOGISTICS MEASURES

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CAUSEWAY

APPENDIX G

LOGISTIC MEASURES

1. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The tactical concept as set forth in the Joint Staff Study requires:

a. The rapid repair and development of existing airfields and the construction of additional airfields in order to support the aircraft to be assigned the occupied areas. Airfield requirements are listed in Appendix F.

b. Early installation of service elements for the development and operation of port facilities, for the support of shore-based forces and for the support of surface forces operating in the area.

c. Provision for rehabilitating the landing forces on objective and preparing them for employment in subsequent operations.

d. Provision for rehabilitating public utilities and furnishing emergency support to the civilian population until the civilian economy can be reestablished.

2. FACTS AFFECTING LOGISTICS.

a. Approximate distances and sailing time (av. rate 10 knots) in days:

	<u>FORMOSA (TAKAO)</u>	
	<u>Naut.</u> <u>Miles.</u>	<u>Days</u>
SAN FRANCISCO	5,741	24.
PEARL HARBOR	4,485	18.7
ENIWETOK	2,490	10.4
ULITHI	1,350	5.6
GUAM	1,500	6.2
MANUS	1,855	7.7
TULAGI - GUADALCANAL	3,020	12.6
NOUMEA	3,812	15.9
DAVAO	990	4.1
MANILA	490	2.
TOKYO	1,260	5.3
SASEBO	805	3.4

SAIGON	1,054	4.4
HONGKONG	340	1.4
CHUNGKING	860	---
SHANGHAI	510	2.1
AMOI	175	.8

Note: Above are airline distances in nautical miles.

b. FORI CSA.

(1) Physical Aspects.

FORI CSA, which lies approximately 100 miles off the CHINA Coast, is approximately 249 miles N and S and 93 miles E and W at its maximum. A central mountain range running NNE to SSW divides the island into a rugged mountainous East country and a low sloping Western Plain. Only about 20 per cent of the entire land area is below 1600' in elevation, and there are many peaks over 10,000'. The Western plain, which is approximately 100 miles long and 20 miles wide, accommodates a great portion of the agriculture and industry, and most of the estimated population of 5,800,000. The inhabitants include 5,000,000 Chinese or their descendants, mostly of KWANTUNG or FUKIEN origin, ruled rigidly and strictly by the 308,000 Japanese in control.

TAINAN Province at the Southern end of the Western plain is the most densely populated area (711.13 per square mile) and is cultivated with rice paddy fields (reputedly impassable except for a few weeks each year in May and October), sugar cane, sweet potatoes, pineapple, and other tropical fruits.

The West Coast shoreline is mostly non-trafficable soil. Mud-flats, and sand bars render landings impractical except at TAMSUI (NW corner of island), SHINCHIKU (Northerly West Coast) and TOKO (Southwesterly). The Southern beaches in TAINAN Province, TOKO-BORYC Area, near the mouth of the wide multi-channelled SHING-TAISUI River have been selected for this operation.

To the North of this large Western plain and separated by relatively low foothills is the SHINCHIKU plain. The port of TAMSUI, at the mouth of the TAMSUI River, is located at the North end of this plain. TAIHOKU, capitol city, lies about 10 miles above the mouth of the TAMSUI River. From TAIHOKU a narrow valley extends through mountainous country to the rocky

ragged harbor of KIRUN on the Northeast Coast. KIRUN is an industrial city and has well-developed port facilities.

At the Northern end of the mountainous East Coast lies a 10 by 15 mile plain, in which is situated the industrial city of GIRUN with its small harbor of SUO. KARENKO, 40 miles South of SUO, lies at the North end of a 75 mile long inland valley with TAITO at its South end. The Eastern mountains and the Eastern slope of the main ridge accommodate most of the 435,000 native FORMOSANS (155,000 aborigines are classed as savages and are on restricted reservations). This coast offers but very limited landing possibilities or areas..

(2) Harbors. Only the harbors within the area to be occupied are included in the description below.

Along the Southwestern coast, soil erosion has caused silt to accumulate in the river mouths and to carry well to seaward resulting in shallow water harbors and beach approaches.

TAKAO Harbor has quayside berthing for at least 10 AK's (10,000 ton type - limited to 27' draft). Six additional ships of similar size can be moored fore and aft in the inner harbor. Additional ships can be accommodated at the moorings if secured side to side. Smaller craft can be accommodated at additional quays. Boat basins are also available in the warehouse areas (some warehouses being revetted) where landing craft can be accommodated for unloading. At least one floating crane and several quay cranes are at present available in the harbor. Extensive railroad facilities serve the harbor.

TOSHLEN Harbor is under development by the Japanese as a Naval Base and can now accommodate ships up to 325' length. The available draft is unknown. Large vessels must be anchored in the open roadstead off the port, which is a suitable anchorage, and discharged by means of landing craft and barges. Unloading facilities for small craft are available in the harbor.

ANPING (Harbor for TAINAN) is suitable for small craft only. An anchorage exists for large ships in the roadstead off this harbor. A canal runs inland to TAINAN where boat basins exist for unloading small boats or barges operating from the large ships in the roadstead.

TOKO Harbor (Japanese seaplane base) has questionable reef conditions at low tide but affords possible unloading areas for small boats or barges used in connection with ships anchored offshore.

NAN WAN Bay on the Southern tip of the island offers anchorages for approximately 30 ships and possible staging area for resupply ships. Unloading must be accomplished across the beach.

(3) Harbor and Beach Capacities.

Roads and railroads (3'6" gage), which cross many bridges over the river beds, now exist and when repaired and strengthened will be available for moving cargo from the docks and beaches. One 5,000 foot bridge over the multi-channelled SHIMO-TAMSUI River is the main connection between the TAKAO-TOSHIEN Area and the BORYO-TOKO Area. Pontoon equipment will be required in the early stages of the operation to effect crossing of this river. The main roads are inferior and will not carry heavy American equipment, so will require immediate engineering attention.

It is estimated that enemy action to block and damage the harbors and bridges and our offensive operations will greatly curtail the harbor and road capacities in the early stages. Unloading over beaches will have to continue for approximately 60 to 90 days pending repair and development of harbor facilities.

Estimated Unloading Capacities at the several ports and beaches are as follows:

<u>Figures in M/T.</u>	<u>1st 35 days</u>	<u>36 to 65 days</u>	<u>66 to 95 days</u>
TAKAO Harbor	175,000	325,000	500,000
TOSHIEN Harbor		65,000	100,000
Beaches:			
North of TOSHIEN		90,000	90,000
*North of SHIMO-TAMSUI River Mouth	140,000	120,000	*120,000
TOKO - NA-PI (North of KATO)	63,000	54,000	54,000
KATO South including BORYO-HOZAN	196,000	168,000	168,000
NAN WAN Bay (South Tip)	<u>63,000</u>	<u>54,000</u>	<u>54,000</u>
Total	637,000	876,000	1,086,000

*60 days use may make this beach untenable necessitating shift to 4,000 yards of beach to North nearer TAKAO Harbor. ANPIN Harbor may offer 21,000 L/T per month unloading for North perimeter troops late in the operations.

(4) Health Conditions.

General health conditions are believed to be poor to fair with malaria, Dengue fever, dysentery, venereal diseases and louse-borne relapsing fever prevalent. Worms and flukes abound throughout the island and human infection by these parasites is common. General lousiness of population renders epidemic typhus fever probable. Mite-borne or "Scrub typhus is epidemic throughout coastal areas. Cholera and plague, serious in past but rare at present, must be considered a continuous threat. Rivers, while numerous, may give low flow during the dry season rendering flow incapable of disposing of raw sewage. Sewage disposal systems are primitive.

(5) Water Supply.

Abundant water comes down from the mountains in the many rivers and is also available from springs and numerous wells. Cities have ample supplies (TAKAO, 200,000 population, 60 gallons per day per capita and TAINAN, 100,000 population, 50 gallons per day per capita) through foothill reservoir systems with piping to population centers. Due to lack of sanitation measures all ground or surface water near populated areas must be considered contaminated requiring use of purification units.

(6) Climate and Rainfall (Basically Sub-tropical).

In the winter the island weather is controlled by the NE monsoon (November through March) with prevailing NE to E winds and heavy rains and frequent heavy low cloud conditions in the North and East; and a dry season, with relatively clear weather, in the Western and Southwestern portion. During April, May, June and October, winds and seasons are variable. From July to September conditions are controlled by the Doldrum Belt and the Southwest monsoon with prevailing SE to SW winds. This is the rainy season in the Western and Southwestern areas with clearer and relatively dry conditions in the North and East areas. Typhoons (averaging two per year), which will prevent all types of military operations for several days at a time, occur from June through October with August the most probable month.

In the Southwestern area within the perimeter of operation, dry conditions (0.5" to 1.5" precipitation per month) with relatively clear skies and frequent winds from 20 to 40 knots occur during the NE monsoon season. Moderate to low winds accompanied by nearly continuous broken clouds occur during the SW monsoon season (average monthly rains 6.5" to 16.8"). Heavy rain squalls with strong and shifting winds occur during this season. The general weather and wind conditions are variable during the monsoon change months.

(7) Natural Resources and Industry (Locations marked with * are located in the perimeter of the currently proposed operations).

The island produces sufficient food and coal for the local population and a strong occupying force, if mining operations are inaugurated and maintained. Rice and sugar have been produced for quantity export. Sweet potatoes, pineapple and tropical fruits are also produced in quantity.

There are several small low-producing oil fields, the principal one near KINSUI (North-West) with refineries at that town and at nearby BYORITSU. Aluminum plants exist at TAKAO* and KARENKO (East Coast); magnesium smelters and works at KARENKO and ANPIN*; copper mines and concentrating plant at KINKASEI (N-E); carbide plant and open coal pits at LINHCO (N-E); nickel smelter at KARENKO; iron smelter at TAKAO*; many sugar refineries, alcohol and butanol plants are located on the Western plain; the principal ones being at KOBI, KAGO, NAUSEI, HLITO* and TAKAO* (two plants); chemical fertilizer plants at KIRUN (N.), KARENKO, KINSUI and TAKAO*; salt works at ANPIN*; drydocks at KIGO* and TOSHIEI*; Marine engine works at TAKAO*; cement plant at TAKAO*; railroad workshops at LATSUYAMA (N.); and aircraft plant at OKAYAMA*. Hydro-electric power for most industries on the island comes from two large plants at JITSUGETSUTAN on the West Central mountain slope.

The high mountains are heavily wooded, containing camphor tree forests which once furnished most of the world's camphor supply. The foothills and lower mountains are covered with heavy tropical jungles, tangles and forests.

c. AMOY (AMOY Harbor and a perimeter - approximately 20 mile radius from AMOY Island).

NOTE: Intelligence information on this area is extremely limited.

(1) Physical Aspects.

The Coast of CHINA from SWATOW to HAITAN Island, (approximately 125 miles to each side of AMOY Harbor) is very irregular in outline with many off-shore islands and numerous shoals and is characterized by yellow sandy gravel, silted mud and reddish clay dotted with innumerable brownish-black boulders. A wide belt of hills and mountains (ridges roughly 3000' high) parallels the entire coast cutting off ready access to the interior. AMOY Harbor contains the city of AMOY (220,000 population, including 10,000 troublesome FORLOSANS) on AMOY Island, and 14 other islands of various sizes and is at the mouth of the delta of the LUNG River. The only significant level areas in the vicinity of AMOY are located in the valleys and delta of the LUNG River. These lowlands are planted with relatively impassable rice paddy fields and are bordered with high, rugged, bare hills.

There are no serviceable roads or operating railroads leading from the harbor area into the interior which is rough, barren and mountainous. AMOY Island (43 square miles) has good roads, particularly the perimeter all-weather 35' concrete road, AMOY City has typical Chinese city roads. Limited good roads exist on the other two large islands, QUELOY and LITTLE QUELOY. KULANGSU (50,000 population) contains the International Settlement (Treaty Port) and has typical Chinese city roads.

AMOY Island mountains (675' to 830') are rugged, bare of trees and appear to resemble piles of rock. The shorelines of the two harbors are very irregular with steep rocky banks. Mud and sand flats, studded with boulders, are dry at low water and offer poor beaches for landings. The islands located in the AMOY Harbor Area have the following gross areas:

KISEU Island	80 acres
*KULANGSU	425 "

KIU SUNG SEU	1,700 acres
HESIOSU SEU	60 "
*AMOY Island	27,500 "

This island has two rugged mountainous or hilly areas, one along the South side and one to the East. The flat lands lie to the North, where a good airport is located.

TSING SEU	20 acres
SEAO TAN	55 "
TAI TAN	150 "
*LITTLE QUEMOY	3,600 "
*QUEMOY	32,600 "

This island has rugged hills in the South and Center (up to 225') but is flat to the North and has a perimeter road.

TWO TIN	1,500 acres
*WU SU	290 "

*Islands to be occupied in assault.

The useable areas of the above islands cannot be determined until either photographs or topographical maps are available. Hydrographic Office charts indicate that the non-useable areas are apt to be a high percentage of the gross areas.

(2) Harbors and Beaches.

AMOY Outer Harbor (7 miles long and 1-3/4 mile wide) is suitable for ships from 30' to 34' draft with a channel approach of 7 fathoms. The main anchorage area has 7 to 16 fathoms of water. The harbor bottom has good holding qualities for the monsoons. Tides are from 13 to 16 feet with currents up to 2 knots. This harbor is well-protected from any weather except when typhoons pass near. During heavy Northeast gales a long swell runs.

AMOY Inner Harbor has an entrance channel between KULANGSU and AMOY Islands (500 yards apart) with 6 fathoms of water and tidal currents up to 3 knots. Tides vary from 12' to 15' and currents run 2 to 3 knots. The harbor affords 5 mooring berths, one for 600' length vessel,

two for 500' length vessels and three for 400' to 500' vessels, with 13 additional anchorage berths for vessels from 200' to 400' length. The principal docks are on SUNGSU Peninsula, which is on the Southwestern shore of the harbor. Four piers are located on SUNGSU Peninsula - one of 850', one of 600', one of 240' and one of unknown characteristic - all apparently capable of accommodating ships of 30' draft. AHOY Island, on the Eastern shore of the harbor, has a 2,140' seawall with three pontoon piers connected to the seawall by ramps. The pontoon piers are 210' long, reputedly capable of accommodating vessels of 25' draft. There are two boat basins for small craft, one 400' by 320' and one 1,500' by 1,000' (dry at lowest tides) and a seaplane ramp. There is one drydock with a 340' bottom length, an 18' sill and associated machine shops. KULANGSU, on the South shore of the harbor, has a 2,000' seawall capable of receiving small craft over a rocky bottom and has two unloading areas.

QUEMOY Harbor between the two QUEMOY Islands has 6 to 11 fathoms of water in the fairway with uneven bottom. This harbor offers limited anchorage during typhoons but is uncomfortable during Southerly winds due to ground swells. There are no apparent docks on QUEMOY Island. Beaches are of unknown quality or characteristics due to very incomplete information.

(3) Harbor and Beach Capacities.

There was one 18 ton dock crane at the AHOY drydock at last reports. No cargo handling facilities are known to be located in the harbors, as all unloading has been accomplished by coolie labor.

There is no intelligence available to permit estimates of beach capacities at this time. It is assumed that beach landings will be difficult due to the tidal range and the extensive mud flats and banks shown on H. O. Charts. Provisions for rapid development of unloading facilities over the beaches must be made.

The following is an assumption as to the tonnage that can be unloaded at the port of AHOY:

1st 30 days	100,000 M/T
2nd 30 days	125,000 M/T
3rd 30 days	150,000 M/T

Present intelligence indicates there are no docks or piers available to support the Japanese airfield or other activities on QUEMOY Island. Due to the apparent activities on this island, some unloading facilities must be available.

(4) Health.

AMOY has had some sanitary improvements in recent years but is still about comparable with other Chinese cities. Smallpox and cholera have been the only two diseases to attain epidemic proportions in recent years. The health conditions listed for FORMOSA, in preceding paragraphs, are believed to be equally applicable to AMOY.

(5) Water Supply.

On AMOY Island there is a modern water works system capable of supplying 1,000,000 gallons of pure water per day, receiving its supply from reservoirs of 2,000,000 gallon capacity in the hills to the East of the town. It is understood that this water is filtered prior to use and that complete purification equipment was held in ready status. There is no data available as to the water situation on the outlying sections of AMOY Island, or on QUEMOY or LITTLE QUEMOY Islands, but the supply is considered to be insufficient for both the native population and troops. Water may prove to be a serious problem. All river water in the LUNG River area should be purified. It is believed shallow wells should produce plenty of water in the coastal area, but well water should also be purified.

(6) Climate and Rainfall.

The climate is sub-tropical (very humid in summer); the temperature ranges from 40° F. in winter to 100° F. in summer. The average rainfall is 48" annually, running as high as 10" per month in the summer and averaging below 1.5" per month in the winter. It is foggy in spring and autumn. Prevailing winds are the SW monsoon from May to September and NE monsoons from October to April. Typhoons occur in the summer but their intensity is lessened by the proximity of FORMOSA Island.

(7) Natural Resources and Industry.

The area around AMOY is rich in minerals such as coal and iron, but such natural resources are entirely undeveloped. Building brick is made in AMOY and some quantity of lumber may be found, as prior to 1938 timber was the principal export and small boat building the principal industry. Insufficient food is raised for the local population, but rice is produced in the LUNG River valley and delta. Garden vegetables are extensively produced on the limited suitable lands.

3. CONTEMPLATED DEVELOPMENT.

a. FORMOSA.

(1) Airfields.

It is assumed that our land operations will bring existing airfields and airfield sites under control of our forces in approximately the following order:

- D SENTEIROYO Airfield - inland from the BORYO-TOKO Beach
- K KOSHAN Airfield - inland from NAN-WAN Bay.
- C REIGARYO Airfield - near South end TAKAO Bay.
- F KIESHU Airfield, 9 miles NE of TOKO.
- G HOZAN Airfield, 8 miles E of TAKAO.
- E HEITO Airfield, 15 miles North of the mouth of the SHIMO-TAMSUI River (East bank).
- M HEITO North Airfield, North of HEITO.
- L OKAYAMA Airfield (North of TOSHLEN).
- H I A tentative site selected for the construction of a new airfield in the vicinity of TOSHLEN.
- J TAINAN Airfield.
- A EIKO Airfield, 4 miles NE of TAINAN.

In order to provide aviation facilities by the dates desired, utmost use must be made of captured airfields and construction work must be initiated for their rehabilitation and extension at the earliest possible date after the fields come under our control. The following development is contemplated:

Recondition and activate the first three fields captured for operation of ^{MAP 12}fighter planes. These fields are desired by D + 15.

Recondition and activate the fourth field captured for operation of dive bombers and torpedo planes. Desired date - D + 25.

Recondition and activate a medium bomber field with desired ready date of D + 25.

Recondition and activate three ^{AR 44}heavy bomber fields as suitable sites are secured. Desired dates are: one by D + 25; one by D + 30 and one by D + 45.

Recondition and activate the seaplane base in TOKO Harbor by D + 90.

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NAVY Seaplanes will be tender-based initially and are desired to be in operation by D / 25.

9, 12, 11. Development of four fields for ^{AKIN} VLR aircraft. The first of these fields are desired by D / 90 and it is desired that all should be operational by D / 150.

Construct one or more tank farms for avgas, with suitable facilities for filling by tanker and suitable distribution systems to ready tank farms at airfields.

Construct camps and other facilities at each airfield.

(2) Naval Facilities.

Develop TAKAO Harbor as the main port for logistic support of the area. Provide facilities for furnishing water to ships. Construct fuel oil and diesel tank farms and tanker discharge facilities to all tank farms in the vicinity.

Develop TOSHIEN by reconditioning the facilities the Japanese are now installing and completing the North basin, dock, shops, warehouses, and other facilities as required, with a view to making this a base for escort vessels and other small Naval craft.

Develop TOKO for handling limited logistic support for the seaplane base, and for the Ground Forces and Air activities in that area.

Develop ANPIN-TAINAN Harbor for barge use, sufficient to render limited logistic support to the Ground Forces on the Northern sector of the perimeter; include pipeline terminal facilities.

Provide barges for initial bulk storage of avgas, mogas and diesel with facilities for shore delivery, pending installation of tank farms. Barges should be available at destination by D / 30.

Provide A/S net protection for the ships which must be anchored offshore for discharge to the beach and shallow water ports by landing craft and barge.

(3) Ground Force Facilities.

Recondition the main road systems; repair and replace as necessary and practicable. Develop the secondary road system to permit support of troops on the perimeter.

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Recondition and activate as much of the railroad system in the area as may be practicable with particular attention to the line: TAKAO, TOSHIEH, OKAYAMA, TAINAN.

Construct camp facilities for the forces ashore. ✓

Construct essential hospital and supply facilities to support the forces ashore and for the emergency relief of the civilian population.

Construct tank farms for mogas and diesel fuel in the TAKAO Area and of other favorable locations capable of being filled from tankers by pipeline.

Develop suitable water supply, using natural sources and purification as required.

Recondition essential public utilities, particularly those connected with sanitation.

b. AMOY.

(1) Airfields.

It is assumed that our land operations will bring the airfield on QUEMOY Island under our control shortly after W-Day and that AMOY Island will be captured shortly thereafter. It is doubtful if the mainland South of AMOY Harbor will offer suitable sites for airfield construction.

As the progress of the occupation progresses, it is contemplated that the following development can be accomplished:

Recondition the existing QUEMOY airfield for fighter operations, to meet the desired operational date of W / 15.

Select site and construct one additional fighter field for operation at earliest practical date. Desired completion date, W / 15.

Recondition the existing field on AMOY for medium bomber operation (VMSB and VLTB). Desired completion date, W / 20.

Select site on QUEMOY if practical, if not, on AMOY, for construction of one medium bomber field for operation by W / 25, if practicable.

Select site and construct field to support two Carrier Air Groups. AMOY Island appears to be the most probable location. It is desirable to have this field in operation by W / 60.

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Select site and construct (North shore ALOY Island appears probable) one Seaplane Base.

✓ Construct bulk tank farms, one on QUELOY Island and one on ALOY Island for avgas, with proper piers or moorings for discharging lighters or tankers.

Construct camps and other essential facilities at each airfield.

(2) Naval Facilities.

Develop ALOY Inner and Outer Harbor for Fleet anchorages and provide Naval Base facilities equivalent to a LION.

Construct docks and piers on QUELOY Island to support airfields and Ground Forces based on that island.

Construct docks and piers on LITTLE QUELOY Island for the support of Forces based on that island.

Develop existing pontoon piers at ALOY City and KULANGSU.

Construct additional docks and piers on ALOY Island to support the airfield and Ground Forces based on that island.

Recondition docks and tank farm on SUNGSEU Peninsula for fuel oil and diesel storage, as required for the support of the Fleet.

Provide barges for initial bulk storage of avgas, mogas and diesel with facilities for shore delivery, pending the installation of tank farms. Barges should be available by W / 30.

Provide A/S net protection for the Fleet Anchorages.

(3) Ground Force Facilities.

Construct camp facilities for the forces ashore on each of the several islands and on the mainland.

Construct essential hospital and supply facilities to support the forces ashore and for the emergency relief of the civilian population.

Reconstruct and develop road systems on the various islands and mainland within the occupied area.

Construct tank farms for mogas and diesel fuel on ALOY, QUELOY and mainland as required, with necessary facilities for filling from tankers.

Develop suitable water supply on all occupied islands and the

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mainland. Full use should be made of natural sources supplemented with purification to reduce the amount of distillation required.

Recondition essential public utilities, particularly those connected with sanitation.

c. Facilities for furnishing logistic support to our forces in CHINA may be desired at FORMOSA and AMOY. This will require additional aviation facilities for staging cargo planes and for landing and handling the cargo to be transhipped by air to CHINA. It is estimated that 50,000 tons a month will be the minimum tonnage to be transhipped.

4. TROOP AND TONNAGE REQUIREMENTS.

a. Supplies to Accompany Units.

A tabulation of the organization equipment pertaining to the units listed in Appendix E gives a total of 2,464,739 ship tons. Based on the total strength of 424,436, this gives an average tonnage of 5.81 ship tons per man.

Past experience has indicated that on an average, units in the assault phase are accompanied by approximately 2 ship tons of organizational equipment per man.

The equipment which is not carried in the assault echelon must be delivered to the objective in subsequent echelons.

The following is the estimated strength for each objective:

	<u>Assault Echelons</u>	<u>Garrison Echelons</u>
FORMOSA	163,000	141,565
AMOY	<u>73,427</u>	<u>46,444</u>
Total	236,427	188,009

Deducting the tonnage of organizational equipment that would be included in the assault echelon (2 ship tons/man) from the total tonnage of organization equipment leaves approximately 1,991,885 or 10.59 ship tons per man for the 188,000 men who must be brought in by the garrison echelons.

The 30 days maintenance supplies, 5 Units of Fire and 10 gallons of water per man, which accompany troops to the objective, total 513,665 ship tons for the entire force. Based on the total strength of 424,436, this gives an average of 1.2 ship tons per man.

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Thirty day's maintenance for the resupply of the objectives will approximate .83 ship tons/man. This figure is lower than that shown in the preceding sub-paragraph due to the elimination of ammunition (approximately .2 ship tons/man) and drummed petroleum products (approximately .17 ship tons/man). It is assumed that the supply of drummed avgas, mogas and diesel will not be required after D + 30 due to the provision of barges to handle bulk products prior to erection of tank farms. Resupply of ammunition will be made by separate shipments.

Ammunition resupply during assault phase will be accomplished by separate ammunition ships. It is estimated that during the first 30 days, ammunition resupply will approximate .47 ship tons/man based on the strength of the assault echelon.

b. Based on the above figures, the following tonnages will have to be landed on the objectives.

	<u>Ship Tons</u>	
	<u>FORMOSA</u>	<u>ALOY</u>
Assault Echelon, and initial resupply:		
Organizational Equipment	326,000	146,854
Accompanying Maintenance	<u>195,600</u>	<u>88,112</u>
Total	521,600	234,966
Resupply Ammunition	76,610	34,510
First 30 day resupply	<u>135,290</u>	<u>60,944</u>
Total	733,500	330,420
Garrison Echelons:		
Organizational Equipment	1,499,172	491,842
Accompanying Maintenance	<u>169,878</u>	<u>55,733</u>
Total	1,669,050	547,575
Monthly Maintenance for		
Total Force	252,789	99,493

c. Estimated beach and harbor capacities in ship tons:

	<u>1st 35 days</u>	<u>2nd month</u>	<u>3rd month</u>
FORMOSA	637,000	876,000	1,086,000
ALOY	100,000	125,000	150,000

(No beach capacities included in capacity of ALOY Harbor)

d. Based on the above data it is apparent that:

The assault echelon and initial resupply tonnage for FORMOSA can be landed within about 40 days.

The assault echelon and initial resupply tonnage for AMOY greatly exceeds the assumed port capacity and will require rapid development of beach facilities for the unloading of approximately 230,000 ship tons, to insure discharge within the first 30 days.

The tonnage of garrison echelons for FORMOSA must be scheduled to arrive during the period D + 30 to D + 120. With proper echeloning, this tonnage, together with the maintenance required during this period, can be landed by D + 120, providing full use of existing or developed beaches is made.

The garrison tonnage for AMOY must be scheduled to arrive during the period W + 30 to W + 120. With proper echeloning and assuming that beach facilities can be developed to handle a minimum of 230,000 ship tons a month, the required tonnage, together with the maintenance required during this period, can be landed by W + 120.

5. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION.

a. Casualties during the assault phase, assumed as 60 days, are estimated to be as follows:

	<u>FORMOSA</u>	<u>AMOY</u>
Killed in Action	5,000	2,500
Wounded - local hospitalization	5,000✓	2,500
Wounded - to be evacuated	<u>14,000</u>	<u>8,000</u>
Total	24,000	13,000

b. Hospitalization.

During assault phase sufficient medical units should be provided with landing forces to care for the anticipated casualties as listed above.

Provision of medical facilities for the care of the civilian population must also be made. It is considered that medical units should accompany the landing forces to provide the following facilities for civil use.

FORMOSA	800 beds.
AMOY	400 beds.

Subsequent to the assault phase, medical units should be increased to provide 5 per cent hospital beds for the military population.

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Hospital facilities for the care of evacuated casualties should be provided in rear areas as indicated below. Where present or contemplated facilities are insufficient, provision for increasing these facilities should be given early consideration:

MARIANAS 8,000 beds.

(Presently contemplated facilities will require expansion.)

OAHU 6,000 beds.

South Pacific Area 8,000 beds.

Total 22,000 beds.

c. Surface Evacuation.

To properly serve the best interests of the patients to be evacuated, utilization of available AH's to their full capacity will be required. Surface evacuation of casualties remaining over and above the capacity of the AH's will be by APH's and by those APA's having the most suitable accommodations. 4 AH's are known to be available for this operation. It is expected that 4 additional new AH's can be delivered in time to be utilized. Of these 8 AH's, it is expected that 6 AH's will be constantly employed in evacuating casualties from the objective to the main staging area in the MARIANAS and that 2 AH's will be required to evacuate suitably selected cases from the MARIANAS to the South Pacific and OAHU.

Based on average capacity, 6 AH's can evacuate in one trip 2,700 litter cases and 900 ambulatory cases. It will therefore be necessary for the available AH's to operate continuously from the objective to the MARIANAS staging area. Considering the probable accumulation of casualties in relation to the timing of the operation, it is estimated that surface evacuation by types of ships will be divided approximately as follows:

	<u>Litter Cases</u>	<u>Ambulatory Cases</u>
6 AH's	5,400	1,800
3 APH's	600	1,500
Sufficient APA's to evacuate (estimated at 40 APA's)	<u>3,000</u>	<u>9,700</u>
Total	9,000	13,000

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The estimated casualty accumulation curve indicates that total casualties will occur approximately twice as fast as the above 6 AH's can accommodate them. However, the accumulation curve for litter cases indicates that the majority of this type of casualty can be carried by the 6 AH's. Careful selection of casualties to be handled by the AH's will therefore be required in order to insure that the facilities of these ships are utilized to the greatest advantage.

d. Air Evacuation.

Hospital facilities in the MARIANAS will be the main staging area for evacuation of casualties. Movement of patients from this staging area to rear area hospitals will be accomplished by available shipping plus air evacuation.

Planes and personnel to carry 600 patients per week from MARIANAS to SoPac hospitals and 400 patients per week to OAHU hospitals will be required during the assault phase.

After airfields are activated on the objective, and suitable preliminary hospitalization and patient-screening facilities are established, planes and personnel to evacuate casualties from the objective to the MARIANAS at the rate of 300 patients per week will be required.

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6. SUPPLY BASES.

a. The following bases are available for the support of the forces that will be engaged in the operation:

MARIANAS. Guam and Saipan provide anchorages for small task forces and limited amounts of support shipping. Repair facilities for amphibious craft and Combatant Vessels, fuel, ammunition and small stores will be available for the supply and maintenance of small task forces and for the emergency support of the fleet. In addition, limited stocks of all classes will be available for the emergency support of ground units engaged in the operation. A control group should be located here for the control of such support shipping as may be staged through the ports in this area.

WESTERN CAROLINES.

ULITHI will be available as a fleet anchorage and final regulating point for support shipping. Elements of Service Squadron 10 should be located here for the support of the fleet and with floating reserve for the support of the ground forces. A control group should be located here for the control of support shipping passing through the regulating station.

Garrison stocks on YAP will provide limited amounts of all classes of supply for the emergency support of ground units engaged in the operation.

Bases in the South Pacific. Supplies and facilities in the area will be available for the support of the forces engaged in the operation. It is not anticipated that any of the ground forces engaged in CAUSEWAY operation will be returned to this area for rehabilitation.

MANUS. Fleet repair facilities and limited supplies for the support of the fleet will be available. ✓

MARSHALLS. The excellent anchorages available should be used as initial staging points for support shipping before it is advanced to the final staging point at ULITHI or the MARIANAS. ENIWETOK should be used as the main regulating station for all support shipping moving to westward bases. Elements of Service Squadron 10 should be located in the area for the support of small task forces.

HAWAII. PEARL HARBOR will continue to be the principal Naval Base west of the U. S. Mainland for the support of the fleet. All supplies

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available in the area will constitute an emergency reserve for the support of the operation.

7. SUPPORT FOR THE FLEET.

a. Fleet Supply.

Due to the distance of the objectives from established fleet bases, reliance must be placed on fleet supply and ammunition ships, oilers and floating repair facilities to effect resupply.

Minor task forces will be able to secure supplies from the stockages available in the MARIANAS and at MANUS.

Some fleet repair facilities will be available at GUAM and at MANUS.

Normally, fleet supply and ammunition ships will be refilled from mainland sources. In emergencies the reserve stocks to be established in the MARIANAS will be available.

b. Fleet Ammunition.

(1) Resupply of ammunition for the fleet will be loaded in fleet ammunition ships and AK's, some of which will be located in advanced bases on D-Day and the remainder soon thereafter, ready to proceed as directed by the Commander, CAUSEWAY Task Forces. Ammunition of the following type will be loaded in these ships:

Armor Piercing, all calibers, and 5 inch common ammunition to fill all close support vessels to required capacity for possible operations.

Reserve ammunition for covering forces.

Replacement bombs and aircraft munitions of all types for carriers.

Two and one-half replacement loads of 5"/38 AA Common and 6, 8, 14, and 16 inch High Capacity ammunition for support vessels.

AA replacement ammunition in all calibers.

Reserves of illuminating, WP, rocket and other special types of ammunition based on previous expenditures.

The amounts of ammunition of each type to be loaded in the various ships will be based on the operation plans and the CAUSEWAY requirements for its support.

(2) In addition to the foregoing, as much ship ammunition of 8 inch caliber and below, as practicable, will be carried in ships of the assault force.

(3) It is planned that a reserve of one complete fleet replenishment

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will be established at ammunition depots on SAIPAN and GUAM, and will be available if required.

c. Fleet Fuel.

(1) Assumptions.

That CentPac and SoPac fuel supply will, as a combined pool controlled by CinCPOA, be diverted as necessary to meet operational requirements.

That SEVENTH Fleet requirements, including those for amphibious force units temporarily under operational control of Com7thFleet subsequent to STALEMATE, will be met separately by CNO.

That CentPac and SoPac requirements, estimated to average 6,500,000 barrels per month from 1 September to 31 December, 1944, will have been met by deliveries principally to MANUS, ULITHI, and MARSHALLS bases, leaving approximately 6,500,000 barrels in PEARL storage intact at the start of this operation.

That fuel oil storage ashore of 300,000 barrels at KWAJALEIN, 450,000 barrels at GUAM, and 150,000 barrels at SAIPAN will be completed and approximately 80 per cent full on February 1, 1945.

That fuel oil storage at MANUS, capacity 500,000 barrels, will be utilized by CentPac forces as necessary, CinCPOA assuming the obligation to arrange delivery of the equivalent fuel consumed.

That all fleet oilers assigned to CinCPOA will be available for this operation, except for those under availability for repairs, probably not more than six.

That fleet units not assigned to this operation will be underway approximately 50 per cent of the time at economical speeds while engaged in training, escort, etc.

That the strategic area in which this operation will be conducted will result in a generally higher level of speed, particularly for carrier task forces.

That bottom fouling will further result in increased consumption over normal curves.

That some losses of tanker or fleet oiler lifts, so far not incurred from enemy action, will result.

(2) Discussion.

Based upon the foregoing assumptions, the total fuel oil required by CentPac and SoPac is estimated at 9,800,00 barrels for the month of February. Succeeding months may be slightly less, depending upon the tactical situation. This includes transportation of assault and garrison forces and maintenance shipping replenishment in the forward area.

With shore storage at KWAJALEITH, GUAM, SAIPAN and HANUS 80 per cent filled, plus floating storage and approximately 1,000,000 barrels available in SoPac forward areas ashore and afloat, there should be available approximately ten days reserve supply available within tactical reach of fleet oilers. This reserve is considered adequate to allow for possible temporary delays in deliveries by allocated tanker to forward transfer bases.

The total fuel required as indicated above will require approximately 110 allocated tanker deliveries per month (including avgas and diesel) to forward bases. With an average turn-around time of 60 days, allocated tanker assignments to CentPac and SoPac must be 220 tankers.

8. SUPPORT FOR LAND BASED FORCES - GENERAL PLAN.

a. Responsibility.

ComGenFOA, ComGenFLFPac, ComServPac and ComAirPac will be responsible, in accordance with existing policies, for the initial supply of all units mounted in the Pacific Ocean Areas and for the resupply of all personnel and organizations to be located on captured objectives.

ComSoPac will be responsible for the provision of adequate areas and accommodations for the rehabilitation or staging of units moved to that area, and for the coordination of the logistic support of all elements of all Services in his area.

b. Supplies to Accompany Troops.

The following supplies should accompany all troops moving to the objectives:

Generally, 30 days supplies of all classes, except ammunition.

Water in drums or cans sufficient for 2 gal/man/day for 5 days.

5 CinCPAC units of fire for all ground weapons.

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Aircraft munitions as follows:

Fighters	20 missions
Search bombers	5 missions
Strike bombers (VBH)	10 missions
Strike bombers (VBM)	12 missions

c. Supply levels to be maintained.

To furnish continuing support and to provide against losses in supplies from various causes, the following levels should be established on captured objectives as soon as possible for all troops thereon:

Classes I, II and IV (less construction materials)

Minimum level	60 days
Maximum level	90 days

Class III, 45 days. Bulk storage for Avgas, Mogas and diesel will be provided as soon as possible.

Class V - Ground Force Ammunition - 10 U/F for all weapons.

Class V - aircraft munitions:

Fighters	40 missions
Search bombers	10 missions
Strike bombers (VBH)	20 missions
Strike bombers (VBM)	24 missions

d. Reserve Supplies.

Responsible Administrative Commanders (see par. 8a) will hold available for shipment from MARIANAS depots an emergency stock of 30 days supplies of all classes (except V) and 4 units of fire for a force the approximate equivalent of the following units:

- 4 Army Divisions
- 2 Marine Divisions
- 4 AAA Gun Bns (SM) (Army)
- 4 AAA AW Bns (SM) (Army)
- 2 AA Bns (Marine)
- 4 155 How. Bns (Army)
- 2 155 How. Bns (Marine)
- 3 4.5" or 155mm Gun Bns (Army)

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- 2 155mm Gun Bns. (SP) FA (Army)
- 2 155mm Gun Bns. (Marine)
- 2 8" or 240mm How. Bn. (Army)
- 2 155mm Gun (SC) Bns. (SM) (Army)
- 1 TD Bn. (Army)
- 6 Combat Eng. Bns. (Army)
- 1 Medical Bn. (Army)
- 3 JASCOS (Army)
- 2 JASCOS (Marine)
- 2 Tk Bns. (Army)
- 2 Sig Bns. (Army)

Additionally, 5 units of fire for two Marine Divisions, 40,000 drums of Avgas with matching tubes and a 30 day supply of classes II and IV for 50,000 men (Navy) will be made available at MARIANAS depots.

Service Squadron TEN (floating storage located initially at UTHI) will be stocked with 15 days class I and III (less Avn.) supplies for 100,000 men, approximately 17,000 drums avgas with matching tubes, and class II and IV for the emergency support of the following personnel:

Army	50,000
Marine	40,000
Navy	10,000

Stocks in the supply depots in the HAWAIIAN Area will be made available for emergency shipments for the support of the operation.

e. Method of Supply.

The following method of supply is tentatively established for planning and procurement purposes:

Prescribed stocks for these islands will be built up to authorized levels within 120 days.

Maintenance supplies will be furnished on an automatic basis (without requisition from bases to be established) for the first 150 days.

Maximum amounts of supplies and equipment will be shipped direct from the West Coast to objectives.

Avgas, mogas and diesel fuel will be supplied in bulk beginning at the earliest practicable date, estimated to be D / 30 for Phase I objectives and W / 30 for Phase II objectives. All other petroleum products will be supplied in drums. To make this method of supply effective, fuel barges or tankers with facilities for discharge to shore must be provided at objectives, prior to the dates specified above, for handling bulk products until such time as tank farms are operative. Provisions for bulk delivery to these tankers or barges must be made.

To augment the initial drummed supply of avgas which will accompany units, 15 days supply of avgas and matching lubes for all planes, expected to be operative on objectives by D / 60, will be loaded in 2 ships and assembled at the forward regulating station by D / 10. This supply will be landed on objectives as soon as possible to establish a reserve of drummed products ashore.

A shipment of maintenance supplies for Phase I objective loaded with 30 days of Cl I, 30 days of essential items of Cl II and IV and 15 days of Cl III (less avn.) for all forces scheduled to be on Phase I objective by D / 30, will be loaded on the West Coast (12 to 15 ships will be required) and dispatched in time to arrive at the advanced Regulating Station, ULITHI, by D - 5. These supplies will be available for movement forward on call of the Landing Force Commander for use as an emergency supply if needed. Otherwise it will form the first maintenance supply shipment.

The second shipment of maintenance supplies for Phase I objective, similar to that described in sub-par. above, will be dispatched in time to be available at ULITHI by about D / 5, and will be available for emergency use if needed.

The initial shipment of maintenance supplies for Phase II objective, loaded with 30 days of Cl I, 30 days essential items of Cl II and IV and 15 days of Cl III (less avn.) for all forces scheduled to be on Phase II objective by W / 30 will be loaded on the West Coast (6 to 8 ships will be required) and dispatched in time to arrive at the Regulating Station, ULITHI, by

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W - 5. These supplies will be available for shipment forward on call of the Landing Force Commander.

The second shipment of maintenance supplies for Phase II objective, similar to that described in sub-par. above, will be dispatched in time to be available at ULITHI by about W / 5.

Subsequent shipments of maintenance supplies for Phase I and II objectives will be scheduled to arrive at ENIWETOK at approximately 10-day intervals (15 to 21 ships will be required), beginning with D / 25 and W / 25, respectively. These subsequent shipments will be loaded with approximately 15 da. supplies, (less drummed avgas, mogas and diesel) for the forces located on Phase I and Phase II objectives, respectively. As soon as prescribed levels are established each maintenance shipment will contain only sufficient supplies to maintain prescribed levels. These shipments will be staged forward through ENIWETOK or ULITHI, or routed direct without staging, as may be determined by the Commander, Forward Area.

Ammunition for resupply of the landing forces will be loaded on the West Coast and dispatched to the regulating station, ULITHI, for shipment forward on call of the Landing Force Commander. The number of ships required and the loading for each will be determined by the Commander, Expeditionary Troops. The following is an estimate of the resupply required:

Five (5) LST's with artillery ammunition to arrive by D - 10.

Three (3) AK's to arrive by D - 5.

Three (3) AK's to arrive by D / 5.

Three (3) AK's to arrive by D / 15.

Three (3) AK's to arrive by D / 25.

The above AK's will be for support of the troops engaged in Phase I and each will be loaded with approximately 7 U/F for a reinforced Division.

Two (2) AK's to arrive by W - 5.

Two (2) AK's to arrive by W / 5.

The above AK's will be for support of the troops engaged in Phase II and each will be loaded with approximately 8 U/F for a reinforced Division.

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Ammunition required for subsequent resupply will be loaded for shipment with maintenance supplies as described above.

The amounts and kinds of ammunition to be loaded on Ammunition Ships and with maintenance supplies will be determined by the Commander Expeditionary Troops.

9. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

a. The difficulty of landing supplies and equipment will determine the speed with which desired facilities can be completed.

b. Liberal provision must be made for rapid improvement of harbor facilities, for handling cargo both in ports and at depots or dumps, and for improving unloading facilities over and inland from selected beaches so that the required troops, supplies and equipment can be landed and ships cleared in the minimum time.

c. Equipment, construction materials and supplies accompanying troops must be reduced to the absolute minimum, by the elimination of all nonessentials, so that debarkation of essential materials will not be prevented.

d. All units, equipment, materials and supplies must be carefully echeloned so that they arrive at destination in the order required and at a rate commensurate with ability to land supplies.

e. The maximum of garrison and development units, equipment, materials and supplies for the development of the objective and the support of the landing and garrison forces must be loaded on the West Coast for direct shipment to the objective.

f. All maintenance and support shipping during the early phases of the operation must be staged through Regulating Stations and dispatched to the objective at a rate commensurate with the capacity of the facilities at the objective to discharge cargo.

g. A regulating group must be established to control the movement of all maintenance shipping in the Forward Area. It should have a representative at each point used as a sub-regulating station or control point to insure unity of control.

h. Particular attention must be paid to provisions for the support and rehabilitation of the civil population and public utilities in the occupied areas.

Pac-1-rr

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Serial

00078

21 June 1944

~~TOP SECRET~~
(to be shown to those who must see it for further study)

CAUSEWAY

Preliminary Draft

1. The attached partial draft of CAUSEWAY is issued for temporary use, and as a basis for completing the supporting annexes yet to be issued. It is not a directive and does not commit the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas to any course of action.

2. Major subordinate commanders within the Pacific Ocean Areas are invited to submit comment leading to the improvement of this draft.

C. H. McMORRIS,
Chief of Staff.

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Thorne
O. L. THORNE
Flag Secretary.

TOP SECRET

CAUSEWAY

(Preliminary Draft)
21 June 1944

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CAUSEWAY

PRELIMINARY DRAFT

PART I

CONCEPT

I. DIRECTIVE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have decided that our first major objective in the War against Japan will be the vital LUZON-FORMOSA-CHINA COAST area and that the most feasible approach to this objective is by way of the MARIANAS-CAROLINES-PALAU-MINDANAO area.

The following operations are included in the main courses of action prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for establishing our forces in the LUZON-FORMOSA-CHINA COAST area:

Occupation of MINDANAO by Southwest Pacific forces, target date 15 November, and establishment of air forces to reduce and contain Japanese forces in the PHILIPPINES preparatory to a further advance to FORMOSA, either directly or by way of LUZON.

Occupation of FORMOSA with target date 15 February 1945, provided the previous capture of LUZON is not necessary. LUZON will be occupied with target date 15 February should such operations prove necessary prior to the move on FORMOSA. In the latter contingency, the occupation of FORMOSA will be deferred.

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II. ASSUMPTIONS

That the strength of the Japanese naval and air forces has been reduced during 1944 to a degree which permits our seizing and maintaining control of the air and sea in the area.

That we have secured our sea communications by establishing control of the MARIANAS-CAROLINES-PALAU area.

That PALAU is in our possession and has been developed as an air base, advanced fleet base, and forward staging area for the support of this operation.

That Southwest Pacific air forces operating from the southern PHILIPPINES will support the capture of FORMOSA by neutralizing Japanese forces in the northern PHILIPPINES to an extent which makes the capture of LUZON prior to the move on FORMOSA unnecessary.

That our operations against FORMOSA will be effectively supported by our air forces operating from bases on the Asiatic mainland.

III. PURPOSES

To establish bases from which to:

- (1) Bomb JAPAN.
- (2) Support further advance into CHINA.
- (3) Sever Japanese sea and air communications between the EMPIRE and the PHILIPPINES, MALAYA, and the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

To establish secure sea and air communications to the coast of CHINA.

To deprive the JAPANESE of the resources of FORMOSA and SOUTH CHINA.

To maintain unremitting military pressure against JAPAN.

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IV. TASK

Capture, occupy, defend, and develop southern FORMOSA and the port of AMOY.

V. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The capture and occupation of FORMOSA and AMOY, which together form one strategic entity, requires that our forces establish undisputed control of the sea and air in the area of the operations concerned. Accordingly, the movement into FORMOSA and AMOY will be preceded by shore based air operations as follows:

- (a) Preliminary reconnaissance of the objectives by air forces based on the Asiatic mainland, supplemented as necessary by those based in the southern PHILIPPINES.
- (b) Destructive attacks on the main Japanese islands by very long range bombers operating from CHINA and the MARIANAS.
- (c) Destructive attacks on the Japanese air forces and bases in FORMOSA, AMOY, and the PESCADORES by air forces based in CHINA.
- (d) Neutralization of the enemy air bases in LUZON by air forces based in MINDANAO.

Prior to amphibious operations against FORMOSA, strong carrier attacks will be made as necessary against critical objectives in LUZON, in the RYUKYUS, and possibly in the main Japanese islands in order to destroy enemy forces and installations and avoid early disclosure of our intentions to the enemy. Carrier attacks against objectives on FORMOSA, AMOY, and in the PESCADORES will be deferred until shortly before the amphibious assault.

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Prior to the operations, the sea communications of FORMOSA and the PESCADORES will be destroyed to the maximum extent practicable by the operations of submarines and by surface and air attacks on shipping.

The passage of the attack force north of LUZON and the approach to FORMOSA will be covered by further intensified attacks on such enemy air bases in LUZON and in FORMOSA as may continue to be effective.

The scheme of maneuver is designed to gain possession as soon as possible of an adequate fleet anchorage at AMOY, and also sufficient airdrome capacity in FORMOSA, together with unloading facilities adequate to support its development, to insure positive control of the air in the area.

PHASE I

Commencing on D-3 day, initiate intensive attacks by carrier aviation in preparation for the assault.

Commencing on D-2 day, conduct bombardment by naval gunfire in preparation for the assault.

Commencing on D day, employing one amphibious corps of two Marine divisions and one infantry division, and one Army corps of three infantry divisions, capture, occupy, defend, and develop the western coastal plain of FORMOSA as far north as the SOBUNKKET RIVER.

PHASE II

Commencing on approximately D plus 20 and employing an amphibious corps of two Marine divisions and three Marine regimental combat teams, seize AMOY, QUEMOY, and adjacent islands and establish defenses to secure the harbor against attack from sea or shore.

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Air bases will be activated as rapidly as possible in southwestern FORMOSA to support a force of twelve fighter squadrons, four light bomber squadrons, four medium bomber squadrons, eight heavy bomber squadrons, twenty-four very long range bomber squadrons, four heavy search squadrons, one long range photographic squadron, four troop carrier squadrons, and three squadrons of patrol seaplanes.

Bases will be activated in the vicinity of AMOY for eight fighter squadrons, four light bomber squadrons, one photographic squadron, two squadrons of patrol seaplanes, and eventually for two carrier air groups.

The air force to be based ashore in the two areas will total approximately 1,200 airplanes.

The port of TAKAO will be developed to the extent necessary to accommodate shipping to support assault and garrison forces, planned developments in the area, and to mount forces for subsequent operations. The port of AMOY will be developed as an advanced fleet base with port facilities to provide logistic support for major fleet units and also occupation forces.

It is estimated that the seizure and occupation of southern FORMOSA will require the employment of expeditionary troops consisting of two corps of three divisions each, with supporting and service troops, and that the seizure of AMOY will require an amphibious corps of the equivalent of three divisions.

~~TOP SECRET~~VI. FORCES REQUIRED

Tentative composition of major units and mounting areas follows. For details see Appendix E.

a. Ground Forces

<u>CORPS</u>	<u>PRINCIPAL TROOPS</u>	<u>MOUNTING AREAS</u>	<u>TIME OF LANDING</u>
III Amphibious Corps to FORMOSA	1st MarDiv 2nd MarDiv 96th InfDiv	SOPAC MARIANAS HAWAII))) D day
XXIV Army Corps to FORMOSA	7th InfDiv 27th InfDiv 81st InfDiv	PALAU SOPAC SOPAC))) D day
V Amphibious Corps to AMOY	4th MarDiv 5th MarDiv Three Marine RCTs	HAWAII HAWAII SOPAC))) D plus 20

b. Garrison Air Forces. By squadrons and exclusive of aviation from other areas participating in the operation.

FORMOSAArmy

4 VBM
8 VBH
24 VLR

Navy

4 PB(HL) Sea
1 VD
2 PB(MS)
1 VH

Marine

9 VMF
3 VMF(N)
4 VMSB/VMTB *Direct support*
4 VMR (forward ech. only)

AMOYNavy

1 PB(MS)) *Part of*
1 VH

Marine

6 VMF
2 VMF(N)
4 VMSB/VMTB
1 VMD (fighter)
4 VMB (ASW trained)

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c. Naval Forces (ASSAULT)

8 BB	7 AGC
11 CV	120 APA ⁵
7 CVL	18 APD
2 CB	39 AKA ⁷
9 CA	7 LSD
11 CL	18 AP (Initial garrison echelon)
3 CL(AA)	22 AK (Initial equipment echelon)
8 OBB	1 AK (Mine sweeper TENDER)
32 CVE	200 LST
171 DD	42 LCI(FS)
42 DE	18 LCI
32 AM	50 LCT
8 DM	72 LSM
10 DMS	42 LCC
12 YMS	1872 LVT (cargo)
12 SC or PC	450 LVT (tank)
12 AT	600 DUKW
4 AN	
2 AV	
2 AVP	
28 SS (exclusive of approximately 12 SS on regular patrol)	

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Naval Forces (BASE DEFENSE)

To be obtained from assault forces where possible.

Fleet Supported Units

2 AV	8 AM
4 AVP	2 AR
1 ARD	6 AN
18 DD	4 AT
12 DE	4 AD
20 LST	1 AGP
2 ARB	2 ARL

Base Supported Units

12 PC	12 LCI(FS)
12 PCS	100 LCT
12 SC	120 LCM
48 PT	180 LCVF
24 YMS	

CAUSEWAY

APPENDIX A

GROUND FORCES

1. ENEMY STRENGTH AND GENERAL CAPABILITIES.

The estimated strength of Japanese forces in FORMOSA as of 7 June 1944 totals 98,000 from all services with 32,000 ground troops. It is probable that the Japanese will reinforce their FORMOSA garrison as the threat of our westward advance becomes more imminent. The areas surrounding KIRUN and TAKAO are fortified as defensive areas. Mobile troops are stationed between the two fortified areas and probably prepared to move to meet invading forces landing at any point on the northern and western coasts of FORMOSA.

Movement of hostile reinforcements should be blocked or delayed by air and surface ship bombardment of the critical points where main road and rail lines cross the numerous streams or closely approach the coastline.

Coast defense guns in the vicinity of TAKAO and TOSHIEN are reported to be capable of firing effectively against amphibious forces attempting to land on beaches between TAKAO and TAINAN. Lagoons and marshy areas inland constitute an obstacle to advance from these beaches.

Between TAKAO and TAIRIMPO amphibious forces would probably be exposed to fire of the fixed coast defenses of TAKAO HARBOR. An added obstacle to landings on this front is the large lagoon between the KIGO PENINSULA and the mainland. The most favorable terrain for direct land advance on TAKAO is from beaches between TAIRIMPO and the mouth of the SHIMOTAMSUI RIVER although fire from coast defense guns is more to be expected on this front than in areas farther to the southeast.

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According to information now available the most favorable coastline for landing and rapid advance inland by large forces is between a point about six miles southeast of TOKO and HURYO (BORYO).

Information is lacking as to enemy strength and dispositions in the AMOY area.

It is assumed that guns are emplaced to defend the harbor area.

It is expected that plans for the assault upon AMOY as well as those for FORMOSA will be modified as more complete information is received.

2. FORCES.

a. Assault Forces. The strength of total forces to be employed in FORMOSA is limited by the capacity of the port of TAKAO. The major assault forces for each objective and their mounting areas are indicated under concept of operations in Part I of this study.

Units of the III Amphibious Corps are mounted in widely separated localities. It is contemplated that after mounting in HAWAII the 96th Division will move to SOPAC thus assembling the III Amphibious Corps, less the 2d Marine Division for rehearsals. The XXIV Corps may rehearse in SOPAC with two divisions or in the PALAU area with three divisions.

The tank battalions normally attached for landing operations to divisions of the XXIV Army Corps are sufficient in number to constitute the principal combat elements of a strong armored force. The necessary command, reconnaissance, supporting and service troops should be procured, moved to the SOUTH PACIFIC and given preliminary training with the tank

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battalions. Advance preparations should be made for detaching the tank battalions from divisions after the initial beachhead on FORMOSA is secured and employing them as units of an armored force.

b. Defense Forces. The principal establishments requiring antiaircraft protection in FORMOSA are airbases and the port of TAKAO. Activation of eleven airfields and one seaplane base is contemplated. It is estimated that eight Army AAA gun battalions, two Army AAA searchlight battalions, seven Army AAA automatic weapons battalions and two Marine anti-aircraft battalions are required to provide anti-aircraft protection for installations on FORMOSA.

At AMOY anti-aircraft protection is needed for one seaplane base, four airfields and the port. Four Marine anti-aircraft battalions are required.

Coast defenses are needed in FORMOSA for the port of TAKAO and for installations at TOSHEIN and the TAKAO lagoon. Estimated requirements are four Army battalions 155mm gun sea-coast artillery (SM).

Three Marine battalions 155mm gun seacoast defense of two batteries each are required for protecting the harbor and anchorages at AMOY.

3. SCHEME OF MANEUVER.

The scheme of maneuver for operations against FORMOSA will comprise:

Preliminary Operations.

Preliminary air operations to obtain reconnaissance, protect the passage of the attack force north of LUZON, and to neutralize hostile air bases in FORMOSA and adjacent areas.

Submarine, surface, and air operations to effect

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maximum destruction of enemy sea communications and to prevent the movement of reinforcements to FORMOSA from other areas.

Phase I. See Annex 1

Commencing on D-3 day, initiate intensive attacks by carrier aviation in preparation for the assault.

Commencing on D day and continuing as long as necessary conduct surface and air bombardment to destroy hostile routes of communication on FORMOSA at vulnerable points in order to prevent or delay the movement of Japanese reinforcements towards the TAKAO-HEITO-BORYO area.

On D day the III Amphibious Corps to commence landing on the beaches between TAIRIMPO and the mouth of the SHIMOTAMSUI RIVER. It will detach approximately one battalion landing team to seize RYUKYU-SHO. Thereafter the III Amphibious Corps with its right resting on the SHIMOTAMSUI RIVER will exert its utmost effort in an advance on HOSAN in order to secure crossings over the SHIMOTAMSUI RIVER and assist the operations of the XXIV Army Corps. Finally this corps will participate with the XXIV Army Corps in the capture of the port of TAKAO and clearing the enemy from the coastal plain south of an east-west line through TAINAN.

On D day the XXIV Army Corps will commence landing on the favorable beaches northwest of BORYO and seize the SUITEIRYO airfield. It will detach one regimental combat team to land on D day at DAIHANRATSU, seize the air facilities at KOSHUN and gain control of the shores of NAN WAN. The XXIV Army Corps will subsequently advance rapidly to the vicinity of RIKO, reorganize for attack in a westerly direction from the general line RIKO-HEITO. When reorganized it will attack with its main effort in the direction: RIKO-OKAYAMA and seize the OKAYAMA airbase. It

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will protect the north flank of the expeditionary forces and participate with the III Amphibious Corps in the capture of TAKAO and in clearing the enemy from the area south of an east-west line through TAINAN. Thereafter the expeditionary troops will advance northward and secure additional areas on the western coastal plain of FORMOSA to the maximum extent permitted by the means available.

Phase II - See Annex 2.

On W Day, approximately twenty days after the initial landings on FORMOSA and after replenishment of ammunition by fire support ships, land troops to secure control of the entrance to AMOY HARBOR and establish artillery shore to support subsequent landings as follows:

QUEMOY ISLAND - one regimental combat team with one battalion of 155mm guns.

WUSU ISLAND - one battalion landing team with one battalion of 155mm guns.

CHINHA POINT - one regimental combat team.

On approximately W plus 3, or as soon as forces making initial landings are prepared to render support seize LITTLE QUEMOY ISLAND employing one regimental combat team (less one battalion) and emplace one battalion of 155mm guns and one battalion of 155mm howitzers to support landings on AMOY ISLAND.

When forces previously landed are prepared to support the action by artillery fire employ one division reinforced in ship to shore operations to seize AMOY and KULANGSU ISLANDS holding the remaining division in reserve until the situation requires its employment.

Subsequently, estimated as W plus 20, seize areas on the mainland of CHINA and establish outposts at distances from

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AMOY HARBOR sufficiently great to prevent hostile artillery fire from interfering with our contemplated utilization and development of the AMOY area. Major elements of the force will be held in mobile reserve prepared to counterattack any hostile force threatening the outpost line.

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25°

121°

122°

25°

FORMOSA STRAIT

24°

24°

23°

23°

22°

22°

PESCADORES ISLANDS
Kichigai To
Hakusa To
Gyoo To
Hako To
Kosei Sho
Hana Shima
Hatto To
Neko Shima
Kusa Shima
O Shima
Tokitchi Sho
Saikitchi Sho
Tosupin Sho

CHANNEL

PESCADORES

D DAY

0 10 20 30 40 50
SCALE OF MILES

XXX
III (-IBLT)

BLT

XXX
XXIV (-IRCT)


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CAUSEWAY

Annex I to Appendix A
GENERAL SCHEME
OF MANEUVER
Phase I

FORMOSA

CINCPOA WAR PLANS



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CAUSEWAY

APPENDIX B

AIR FORCES

1. BROAD CONCEPT OF AIR OPERATIONS.

CAUSEWAY will involve coordination of the efforts of the air forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas, the Southwest Pacific Area, and CHINA. Its successful conclusion will permit establishing our air forces in positions from which all parts of JAPAN may be bombed and from which the enemy air forces can be brought effectively and continuously to action. It may be expected that the enemy will oppose the operation with the full strength of his air force, except for a reserve for home defense, and this opposition may be of an all-out character. Likewise since control of the air in the area of operations, as well as control of the sea, is essential to the success of the operation, our air forces must operate to the limit of their capabilities to ensure the destruction of the enemy air forces which oppose them.

Enemy air effort, which will stem from numerous bases in LUZON, FORMOSA, AMOY, the RYUKYUS, south CHINA, and possibly from carrier forces, must be frustrated prior to the operation by:

a. Utilizing strong fast carrier groups to exploit to the fullest every opportunity to engage and destroy the enemy fleet or surface forces.

b. Destroying aircraft and air installations at the objectives and at bases within supporting distance by combined effort of shore and carrier based aircraft.

c. Preventing replenishment and habilitation of bases so destroyed by the sustained effort of shore based

air forces, supplemented when required by additional carrier attacks.

d. Diverting enemy air strength to other areas well in advance of the amphibious operation by making strong fast carrier attacks against critical objectives in the RYUKYUS and possibly in the main islands of JAPAN.

The enemy has numerous air bases on LUZON and FORMOSA and large reserves in the EMPIRE. Air bases at HONG KONG, AMOY, and along the CHINA coast to SHANGHAI and in the RYUKYU ISLANDS are within supporting distance of the SOUTH FORMOSA-AMOY area.

Prior to CAUSEWAY, the sustained effort of all our available air forces must be directed against air bases and installations within approximately 600 miles of the FORMOSA - AMOY area in order to reduce to the minimum the enemy's ability to react.

The 14th and 20th Air Forces in CHINA should concentrate all available effort against enemy air bases on FORMOSA and supporting bases along the CHINA coast from HONG KONG to SHANGHAI.

The 20th Air Force and other units in the MARIANAS should secure the northern flank of our approach by operating against objectives in the Japanese Homeland and air bases in the RYUKYU ISLANDS. Also, well in advance of amphibious operations, strong Fast Carrier Task Forces will make diversion attacks against critical objectives in the RYUKYUS and possibly in JAPAN.

Southwest and Central Pacific air forces should secure the southern flank by operating to neutralize enemy air bases in the PHILIPPINES. Interim carrier air attacks

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will be made against critical objectives in the PHILIPPINES as may be required to assist the shore based air forces in knocking out enemy air opposition along this flank.

After enemy air opposition of FORMOSA and adjacent air bases has been sufficiently reduced, Fast Carrier Task Forces will operate as a Covering Force to intercept and destroy enemy surface forces that may threaten the operation.

After the Fast Carrier Task Forces are committed to covering operations, the escort carriers will have the task of continuing to neutralize air opposition on FORMOSA, the PESCADORES, and in the vicinity of AMOY, in cooperation with our CHINA based air forces. Escort carriers will also furnish all support aircraft in order that the Fast Carrier Task Forces may be free to exploit to the fullest any opportunity to engage and destroy the enemy fleet or surface forces.

2. TASKS.

The tasks to be accomplished by aircraft in chronological sequence are:

- a. Reconnaissance of the objective and supporting bases.
- b. Search of ocean areas to cover sea approaches to the objective.
- c. Interdiction of enemy air bases to cover the operations of our surface forces.
- d. Destruction of enemy aircraft and air installations.
- e. Destruction of enemy surface forces and shipping.
- f. Close protection of our surface forces.

TO: [REDACTED]

g. Direct support of landings and operations ashore, including destruction of fixed defenses.

h. Air defense of captured bases.

3. DISTRIBUTION OF TASKS, SHORE BASED AVIATION (See Annex 1)

14th Air Force

Surveillance and photographic reconnaissance of FORMOSA and AMOY, as well as of bases in the HONG KONG - SHANGHAI area.

Destruction of aircraft and air installations in the HONG KONG - AMOY area, to be intensified from D-14.

Photographic reconnaissance as required and in conjunction with all attacks.

XXth Bomber Command (CHINA)

Initial strikes against EMPIRE and RYUKYUS targets.

After D-14 shift attacks to FORMOSA and AMOY bases and assist 14th Air Force by striking bases in the HONG KONG - SHANGHAI area.

After D-4 return attack to EMPIRE and RYUKYU targets with strikes in the HONG KONG - SHANGHAI area as may be required.

Photograph the RYUKYUS.

Allied Air Forces, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC (PHILIPPINES)

Insure continued destruction of aircraft and air installations in the PHILIPPINES.

Establish a search sector from the southwest PHILIPPINES, (preferably ZAMBOANGA) across the SOUTH CHINA SEA to FRENCH INDO-CHINA that will definitely locate all surface traffic to and from the EMPIRE.

Attack all shipping so located.

Search sea areas north of LUZON and southwest

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and east of the objective, to a distance of 800 miles.

Extend searches in above to 1000 miles beginning D-10.

Photographic reconnaissance as required and in conjunction with all attacks.

CENTRAL PACIFIC Air Forces (MARIANAS)

Search ocean areas to the northwest toward EMPIRE and the RYUKYUS to a distance of 800 miles.

Increase searches in above to 1000 miles from D-10.

Strike CAROLINE and BONIN ISLANDS bases as required to maintain neutralization.

Strike shipping located by searches.

Photographic reconnaissance of BONINS and CAROLINES as required, and in conjunction with all attacks.

XXI Bomber Command (MARIANAS)

Strike EMPIRE and RYUKYU ISLANDS targets.

From D-10 shift to targets on FORMOSA.

After D-4 return to EMPIRE and RYUKYU ISLANDS targets.

Photograph the RYUKYUS and all attacks.

CENTRAL PACIFIC Air Forces (PALAU)

Search to the north toward EMPIRE to a distance of 800 miles.

Increase search distance to 1000 miles from D-10.

Assist the Allied Air Forces(MINDANAO) in all phases of their effort as required.

4. CONCEPT OF FAST CARRIER TASK FORCE OPERATIONS. (See Annex 2)

a. Tasks

EXPLOIT TO THE FULLEST EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY THE ENEMY FLEET OR IMPORTANT SURFACE FORCES. (Task Groups, which are screened by fast battleships, should operate

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in as close mutual tactical support as the nature of the task will permit.)

Destroy enemy aircraft and air facilities on FORMOSA and adjacent enemy air bases.

Prevent enemy surface forces from attacking our Joint Expeditionary Forces.

Provide air cover for minesweeping operations in SOUTH CHINA SEA until these duties can be assumed by escort carriers.

Conduct aircraft mining operations of TAMISUI and KEELUNG HARBORS.

Sustained carrier attacks against FORMOSA and adjacent enemy air bases will commence on D-3. The restricted area and shallow waters of the SOUTH CHINA SEA - FORMOSA STRAIT region makes it inadvisable for fast carrier forces to operate within these confines until enemy mines have been cleared and enemy submarines have been driven out.

D-3 day:

Initiate carrier air strikes on FORMOSA, the PESCADORES, and other adjacent enemy air bases.

Destroy enemy aircraft, air, and anti-aircraft installations.

Destroy enemy shipping.

Destroy hostile defenses.

Make close photographic reconnaissance of objectives as required.

Provide cover for minesweeping operations in SOUTH CHINA SEA and FORMOSA STRAIT.

D-2 day

Continue air operations against enemy objectives to eliminate enemy air opposition and to destroy shipping and

defenses.

Conduct aircraft mining operations of TAMISUI and KEELUNG HARBORS.

Continue to cover minesweeping operations.

D-1 until completion of operations:

Interdict reinforcements to northern FORMOSA until relieved by garrison aircraft about D plus 15.

After enemy air opposition from FORMOSA and adjacent air bases has been sufficiently reduced, Fast Carrier Task Forces operate as a Covering Force to intercept and destroy surface forces that may threaten the operation.

Attack enemy air and naval bases in RYUKYUS.

Commence refueling operations and rotation of Fast Carrier Groups between forward areas and replenishment areas as required and as circumstances will permit. Nearest bases for replenishment of ammunition are PALAU and the MARIANAS.

b. Organization.

FORCE	A		B		C	
TASK GROUP	1	2	3	4	5	6

TYPE OF SHIP						
CV	2	2	2	1	2	2
CVL	1	1	1	2	1	1
BB	4	4	-	-		-
CB	-	-	2	-		-
CA (BALTIMORE)	-	-	-	3		-
CL (AA)	-	-	2	1		-
CL	-	-	-	-	4	4
DD	12	12	12	12	12	12

c. Areas of Operations.

Force A: Groups screened by BBs, Groups 1 and 2 operate initially against objectives in North, Northwest to West Central FORMOSA and the PESCADORES. Conduct search sector 270° - 090° to maximum radius carrier aircraft.

Force B: Groups screened by CBs and CAs, Groups 3 and 4 operate initially against objectives in Eastern FORMOSA and KOTO-SHO ISLAND. Assist other forces as required. Conduct search sector 090° - 180° to maximum radius carrier aircraft.

Force C: Groups screened by CL, Groups 5 and 6 operate initially against objectives in South, Southwest to West Central FORMOSA and the PESCADORES.

5. CONCEPT OF ESCORT CARRIER OPERATIONS.

Prior to D-1, 32 CVE will be available to:

Provide close protection for attack forces and convoys.

After D-1, 8 CVE will be required to cover retirement of ships to rear areas.

24 CVEs will be required to:

a. Neutralize air opposition on FORMOSA, the PESCADORES, and in the vicinity of AMOY, in cooperation with our CHINA based air forces.

b. Relieve Fast Carrier Forces in protection of mine sweeping operations in SOUTH CHINA SEA and FORMOSA STRAIT.

c. Provide all support aircraft.

d. Interdict routes of advance of hostile reinforcements moving toward the TAKAO Area.

e. Photograph objectives as required.

f. Conduct, in cooperation with surface forces, hunter-killer operations as required.

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
6. TRANSPORT CARRIERS

ComCarTransRonPac will designate CVE's to transport to the area of operations:

Replacement aircraft, pilots, and spare parts for the CV's, CVL's, and escort carriers.

Marine fighters and scout or torpedo bombers for garrison purposes as scheduled in "Concept of Airfield Development."

These transport CVE's will be in addition to the 32 CVE's listed above under Naval forces required for escort carrier operations.



Legend:

- VBH Attack Areas
- VLR Attack Areas
- Search Areas
- Stage
- ▢ Objective

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Annex I to Appendix B
PROPOSED OPERATION
SHORE BASED AVIATION

14th Air Force
XXth Bomber Command

Central Pacific Air Forces
XXI st Bomber Command

Allied Air Forces
(SWPA)

Central Pacific
Air Forces

CAROLINE ISLANDS

CINCPAC
WAR PLANS
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ANNEX 2 TO APPENDIX B
PROPOSED CARRIER OPERATIONS

- CARRIER AIR ATTACK IN RED
- DOTTED LINES
- OPERATIONS OF GARRISON AIR COMMENCING NOT LATER THAN D+15

D+1, D+2. 2 FAST CARRIER GROUPS ATTACK ENEMY AIR BASES, INSTALLATIONS, AND SHIPPING IN RYUKYU ISLANDS.

FUELING AREA BLUE
FUEL ALL FAST CARRIER FORCES IN ROTATION, D-1, D, D+1 AND THEREAFTER AS REQUIRED.

FUELING AREA RED
D-5 TOP OFF ALL DD FROM TANKERS AND HEAVY SHIPS.

FUELING AREA GREEN
TANKERS AVAILABLE IN THIS AREA ABOUT D+2 FOR ALL SHIPS OF ATTACK FORCE.


D-1 AND UNTIL NO LONGER REQUIRED:
24 CVE OPERATE AGAINST OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHERN FORMOSA, THE PESCADORES, AND AMOY. PROVIDE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT.

CARRIER GROUPS IN MARSHALLS FUEL TO CAPACITY AND DEPART D-14.

FUEL TO CAPACITY ALL SHIPS - 2 DAYS ALLOWED.

CARRIER GROUPS IN ADMIRALTIES FUEL TO CAPACITY AND DEPART ABOUT D-12.

ALTERNATE ROUTE



CAUSEWAYAPPENDIX CNAVAL FORCES

1. COVERING FORCE. The Covering Force is expected to be organized by groups approximately as follows:

<u># 1</u>	<u># 2</u>	<u># 3</u>	<u># 4</u>	<u># 5</u>	<u># 6</u>
2 CV	2 CV	2 CV	1 CV	2 CV	2 CV
1 CVL	1 CVL	1 CVL	2 CVL	1 CVL	1 CVL
4 BB	4 BB	2 CB	3 CA (BALTIMORE)	4 CL	4 CL
		2 CL(AA)	1 CL(AA)		
12 DD	12 DD	12 DD	12 DD	12 DD	12 DD

This force is expected to proceed initially from MANUS and the MARSHALLS about D-14 and D-12 respectively, reaching the objective in time to commence aerial bombardment on the morning of D-3. Thereafter, groups will be organized and disposed in such manner that their logistic support can be maintained, while at the same time they will remain strategically concentrated in sufficient strength to destroy any threatening enemy forces.

2. MINESWEEPING FORCE. The Minesweeping Force is expected to be organized approximately as follows:

32 AM - 8 DM - 10 DMS - 12 YMS - 12 PC or SC - 1 AK

This force is expected to assemble in PALAU in time to depart on D-9, arriving at the objective on the early morning of D-3. Minefields immediately west and south of TAKAO will be swept, under cover of carrier aircraft by the evening of D-2; minefields northwest of TAKAO will be swept by the evening of D day, after which sweepers will proceed to open and mark a ten-mile passage through the FORMOSA STRAIT to the vicinity of AMOY, and to clear an area of approximately 20 miles radius near that objective. This will be completed by D plus 15.

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3. ADVANCED FIRE SUPPORT FORCE. The Advanced Fire Support Force is expected to be organized approximately as follows:

8 OBB - 6 CA - 3 CL - 4 CVE - 42 LCI(FS) - 18 DD

This force is expected to assemble in MANUS in time to depart on D-9, arriving off the objective at dawn on D-1. It will remain in close support of shore operations until required to replenish ammunition (estimated about D plus 6); units are then expected to return to PALAU, receive ammunition and fuel and return to AMOY by dawn on W-1 (estimated about D plus 19). Additional combatant ships which accompany assault forces as escorts will be prepared to provide close fire support for shore operations after departure of the Advanced Fire Support Force.

4. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT FORCE. Thirty-two CVE's are set up initially in various ports to escort assault forces to the objective; of these, it is expected that 24 will remain in the objective area to provide close air support for the assault and continuing operations ashore. The remaining 8 CVE's are expected to be utilized as escorts for units retiring from the area.

5. ASSAULT FORCE. Following STALEMATE, it is anticipated that four transport groups, consisting of 48 APA and 12 AKA, will be made available to the Seventh Fleet for SOUTHWEST PACIFIC operations. These groups will be expected to return to South Pacific bases for mounting CAUSEWAY forces by 31 December. These groups will be augmented by 8 APA and 8 AKA from new construction for the purpose of mounting the III and XXIV Corps troops. A total of 120 APA and 39 AKA will be required for the operation; new construction is expected to provide sufficient ships to meet this requirement. Numbers

of ships should be disposed as indicated in the following tables in order to conform to mounting points for troop divisions. Designation of assault ships by name is tentatively included in order to provide the assault commander with a basis on which to inaugurate advance planning. Consideration has been given to the anticipated dates of readiness of ships, distances to mounting points, and dates required at those points. Designation will undoubtedly change as dates of readiness of individual ships change.

SOUTH PACIFIC

56 APA and 20 AKA tentatively expected to be available by approximately D-40 to mount the 1st, 27th, 81st Divisions; 4th, 22nd, 29th Regts.; III - XXIV Corps Troops.

APA

1	DOYEN	31	MONROVIA	51	SHERIDAN
2	HARRIS	32	CALVERT	52	SUTTER
3	ZEILIN	34	BOLIVAR	53	WARREN
6	HEYWOOD	35	CALLAWAY	54	WAYNE
7	FULLER	36	CAMBRIA	55	WINDSOR
8	BIDDLE	37	CAVALIER	56	LEEDSTOWN
9	NEVILLE	39	CLAY	58	APPLING
10	LEE	40	CUSTER	59	AUDRAIN
11	FELAND	41	DU PAGE	60	BANNER
12	LEONARD WOOD	42	ELMORE	61	BARROW
16	BELL	43	FAYETTE	62	BERRIEN
18	PRES JACKSON	44	FREMONT	89	FRED FUNSTON
19	PRES ADAMS	46	KNOX	90	JAMES O'HARA
20	PRES HAYES	47	LAMAR	91	ADAIR
21	CRESCENT CITY	48	LEON	94	BAXTER
25	MIDDLETON	49	ORMSBY	96	CECIL
27	GEO CLYMER	50	PIERCE	187	OCONTO

APA (Cont'd)

188	OLMSTEAD	5	FORMALHAUT	17	CENTAURUS
190	PICKENS	6	ALCHIBA	19	THUBAN
191	PONDERA	7	ALCYONE	20	VIRGO
192	RUTLAND	9	ALHENA	21	ARTEMIS
193	SANBORN	10	ALMAACK	22	ATHENE
	<u>AKA</u>	12	LIBRA	54	ALGOL
3	BELLATRIX	13	TITANIA	55	ALSHAIN
4	ELECTRA	16	AQUARIUS	57	CAPRICORNUS
				58	CHARA
				59	DIPHDA

HAWAII

12 APA and 3 AKA tentatively expected to be available by D-60 to load the 96th Division, transport them to SoPac, rehearse and mount them in SoPac.

	<u>APA</u>		<u>AKA</u>
63	BLADEN	69	CARLSON
64	BRACKEN	70	CARTERET
65	BRISCOE	151	LAPORTE
66	BRULE	152	LATIMER
67	BURLESON	153	LAURENS
68	BUTTE	189	OXFORD
		23	AURELIA
		24	BIRGIT
		25	CIRCE

PALAU

12 APA and 3 AKA tentatively expected to be available by D-30 to mount the 7th Division.

	<u>APA</u>		<u>AKA</u>
71	CATRON	123	KITTSOON
95	BURLEIGH	124	LAGRANGE
97	DAUPHIN	125	LANIER
120	HINSDALE	126	-----
121	HOCKING	127	-----
122	KENTON	154	LOWNDES
		60	LEO
		64	TOLLAND
		88	UVALDE

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12 APA and 3 AKA tentatively expected to be available
by D-30 to mount the 2nd Division.

<u>APA</u>		<u>AKA</u>			
155	LYCOMING	194	SANDOVAL	26	CORVUS
156	MELLETTTE	195	_____	27	DEVOSA
157	NAPA	196	_____	28	HYDRUS
158	NEWBERRY	197	_____		
159	_____	198	_____		
160	_____	199	_____		

HAWAII

28 APA and 10 AKA tentatively expected to be available
by D-40 to mount the 4th and 5th Divisions and the
V Corps troops.

<u>APA</u>		<u>AKA</u>			
72	CLAREDON	132	_____	30	LUMEN
73	CLEEUANE	161	_____	31	MEDIA
74	CALUSA	162	_____	32	MELLENA
75	CORTLAND	163	_____	61	MULIPHEN
76	CRENSHAW	164	_____	76	TORRENCE
98	DUTCHESS	200	_____	77	TOWNER
99	DADE	201	_____	78	TREGO
106	GLADWIN	204	SARASOTA	89	WARRICK
110	GRIGGS	205	SHERBURNE	90	WHITESIDE
111	GRUNDY	206	SIBLEY	91	WHITLEY
128	_____	207	_____		
129	_____	208	TALLADEGA		
130	_____	209	TAZEWELL		
131	_____	210	TELFAIR		


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The following are expected to be available to PhibTraPac:

APA	14	HUNTER LIGGETT
	17	AMERICAN LEGION
	92	ALPINE
	93	BARNSTABLE

The following are expected to be available to COTCPac upon reporting:

APA	57	GILLIAM
	117	HASKELL
	118	HENDRY
	119	HIGHLANDS



Regular Transport Groups
Lift for One Troop Division
Approx. 12 APA, 3 AKA

Special Transport Groups for Corps Troops
Approx. 4 APA, 4 AKA

All TransDivs originating in U.S. (including IV and VI) are from new construction
The 4 TransGroups initially in SWPac will receive new APA to relieve AP as
new construction becomes available.

ROMAN NUMERALS - TRANSPORT DIVISIONS
ARABIC NUMERALS - TROOP DIVISIONS

CAUSEWAY

Annex I — Appendix C

EMPLOYMENT of ASSAULT SHIPPING

CINCPOA WAR PLANS

TOP SECRET

PROPOSED ASSEMBLY OF NAVAL FORCES

CAUSEWAY

Annex 2 - Appendix C

	D-70	D-60	D-40	D-30	D-15
HAWAII	20 LST 8 LSM 6 LCC 5 LCT 6 DE	12 APA 3 AKA 1 AGC 1 LSD 4 CVE 9 DD	28 APA 10 AKA 50 LST 1 AGC 1 LSD 16 LSM	6 LCC 10 LCT 4 CVE 18 DD	
SOPAC			90 LST 32 LSM 25 LCT 18 LCC 4 CVE	12 APA 3 AKA 1 AGC 1 LSD	4 CVE 12 DD 6 DE
MANUS			6 DD 44 APA 17 AKA 2 AGC 2 LSD		8 OBB 42 LCI(FS) 18 DD 18 DD 24 DE 8 CVE
MARSHALLS					4 CVE 6 CA 3 CL 12 AT 2 AV
MARIANAS				12 APA 3 AKA 20 LST 1 AGC 1 LSD	8 LSM 6 LCC 4 CVE 5 LCT 9 DD
PALAU				18 APA 3 AKA 20 LST 1 AGC 18 APD 1 LSD	32 AM 12 YTS 12 PC or SC 8 DM 10 DTS 1 AK

The Covering Force is engaged in preliminary strikes and is not included in this table.

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CINCPAC WAR PLANS

CAUSEWAY

ANNEX 3 - APPENDIX C

TRACKS OF ASSAULT FORCES

FIRE SUPPORT SHIPS

DEPART ADMIRALTY	D-9
ARRIVE FORMOSA	D-1
DEPART FORMOSA	D+6
ARRIVE PALAU	D+10 (RE-ARM)
DEPART PALAU	W-6 (EST. D+14)
ARRIVE AMOY	W-1 (EST. D+19)

4TH & 5TH MAR DIVS
& V. CORPS TROOPS
DEPART HAWAII

TRACTOR GROUP • W-29
TRANSPORT GROUP ■ W-23

4TH & 5TH MAR DIVS & V. CORPS
TROOPS JOINED BY 4TH, 22ND &
29TH REGTS.

ENIWETOK

ARRIVE	DEPART
• W-17	W-14
■ W-13	W-10

2ND MAR DIV
DEPART SAIPAN

• D-13
■ D-11

7TH DIV MOUNTED
IN PALAU, JOINS
GROUPS FROM
SOPAC & SAIPAN

PALAU
ARRIVE DEPART
D-9 D-8 D-7 D-5 D-9

DEPART ADMIRALTY

FIRE SUPPORT ■ D-9

4TH, 22ND, 29TH REGTS.
DEPART SOPAC
• W-23 (EST. D-3)
■ W-17 (EST. D+3)

1ST, 27TH, 81ST, 96TH DIVS.
III. CORPS TROOPS
XXIV. CORPS TROOPS
DEPART SOPAC
• D-18
■ D-14

JIGPOA D-1017

CAUSEWAY

APPENDIX D

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

1. ESTIMATED SITUATION. By the date of this operation it is expected that Task Force 17 will be able to maintain 40 submarines on station; Task Force 71 should be able to maintain at least 15 submarines on station.

The enemy fleet might be based in SINGAPORE or in MANILA BAY, but is more likely to be based in the EMPIRE when CAUSEWAY is initiated.

Enemy troop reinforcements may be brought in to FORMOSA from North CHINA and from the EMPIRE. It is considered unlikely that reinforcements can be brought in from the south because of continued military pressure by our Southwest Pacific Forces in MINDANAO, and because of expected shipping difficulties south of FORMOSA incident to our control of the air in the PHILIPPINE AREA.

2. TASKS.

(a) Cut off all surface reinforcement of troops, supplies, and equipment between the EMPIRE or North CHINA and Northern FORMOSA. Heavy concentrations of our submarines should operate as close to the port of KEELUNG as practicable.

(b) Provide lifeguard service as follows:

TAKAO	- D-30 to D-2
PESCADORES	- D-30 to D 4 5
AMOY	- D-30 to D 4 18
KEELING	- D-5 to D 4 30
Southern RYUKYUS	- D-10 to D 4 5
Northern RYUKYUS	- D-10 to D 4 5


(c) Maintain observation of fleet bases in the RYUKYUS and BONINS.

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(d) Continue to maintain patrols in the EMPIRE and North CHINA areas in order to inflict unremitting attrition on enemy shipping and in order to assist in cutting off communications to FORMOSA.

(e) Task Force 71 is expected to provide observation of enemy combatant units in the MALAY - N.E.I. area; and to continue attrition operations against enemy shipping in that area.

3. RESTRICTIONS. Except for submarines on lifeguard stations as indicated and on specified routes to rehabilitation bases it is expected that the area south of approximately 24-30 North will not be entered by Task Force 17 submarines. Specific operating areas will be designated by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas.



**CAUSEWAY
SUBMARINE DISPOSITIONS
Annex I to Appendix D**

Numbers are approximate, Geographical
areas are variable and are shown only
as an indication of the general concept
of Submarine Employment.

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~CAUSEWAYAPPENDIX ESUPPORTING AND SERVICE FORCES REQUIREDNUMBER OF UNITS - STRENGTH

<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>FORMOSA</u>			<u>AMOY</u>		
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
Hq & Hq Co & Sp Trs	2--1212		1--2000			1--2000
Not listed else- where						
Includes person- nel for Civil Affairs						
<u>AAA UNITS</u>						
Hq & Hq Btry AAA Brig	1-- 74					
Hq & Hq Btry AAA Gp	2-- 142					
AAA Gun Bn(SM)	8--5160					
AAA S/L Bn(SM)	2--1706					
AAA Bn AW (SM)	7--5033					
AA Bns, Marine			2--2200			4--4400
Sub Total	12115		2200			4400
<u>ARTILLERY UNITS</u>						
Hq & Hq Btry FA Brig	1-- 103					
Hq & Hq Btry FA Gp	4-- 392		1-- 98			1-- 98
155mm How Bn	4--2124		3--1950			3--1950
4.5" or 155mm Gun Bn	2--1062		3--2211			3--2211
FA Obsn Bn (A)	2--1010					
155mm Gun SP (FA)	4--2024					
8" or 240 How Bn	4--2324					
155mm (SC) Bn (SM)	4--2152					3--1584
Sub Total	11191		4259			5843

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<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>FORMOSA</u>			<u>AMOY</u>		
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
<u>TANK DESTROYER</u>						
Hq & Hq Co TD Gp	1--	74				
TD Bns	2--	1342		1--	671	
Sub Total	1416			671		
<u>TANKS</u>						
Hq & Hq Det TK Gp	1--	101				
TK Bns	4--	3004	(One Med TK Bn each MarDiv.)	included organically in		
Sub Total	3105					
<u>ORDNANCE UNITS</u>						
Gp Hq & Hq Det	1--	53				
Bn Hq & Hq Det	8--	200				
Bomb Disposal Sqd	6--	42				
Hv Maint (FA) Co	3--	594				
Hv Maint TK Co	2--	420				
Dep Co	3--	558				
Maint Co AA	2--	326				
M Auto Maint Co*	3--	360				
Hv Auto Maint Co	1--	211				
Tire Rep Plat	1--	39				
Am Co*	6--	1116				
MM Co*	11--	1859				
Sub Total	5778					

Note: * Medium Maintenance for Marine Corps Units performed by Mar. Field Depot, reinf.

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<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>FORMOSA</u>			<u>AMOY</u>		
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
<u>SIGNAL UNITS</u>						
JASCO'S	4--1512		2-- 758			3--1137
Sig Bns	2--1654 ✓		✓1-- 781			✓1-- 781
Sig Rep Co	1-- 188					
Photo Plat	1-- 50					
Rad Int Co	1-- 259					
Joint Com Cen	1-- 500				1-- 350	
Sig Dep Co	1-- 191					
Sig Cons Bn	2--1190**			1- 595		
Cable Ships***						
Cable Barges Shallow						
Draft***	2--					
Sub Total	5544		1539	595	350	1918

Note: ** One (1) Signal Construction Bn (A) to accompany Cable Ship.

*** Floating Equipment.

QUARTERMASTER UNITS

Gas Sup Co*	2-- 256					
Serv Bns	5--4705					
Trk Regt	1--1635					
Ster Cos	2-- 318					
Car Co	1-- 135					
Dep Co (Sup)	4-- 776					
Mar. Serv Co			1-- 258			1-- 258
Mar. Ldry Co			1-- 268			1-- 268
Mar. Mtr T Bn			1-- 628			1-- 628
Mar. Salv Co			1-- 118			1-- 118
Gr Reg Co	2-- 260					
Salv Coll Co	2-- 418					
Hq & Hq Co QM Base Dep	1-- 154					
Ldry Cos	3-- 819					

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TYPE OF UNIT	FORMOSA			AMOY		
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
QM UNITS (Cont'd)						
Salv Rep Co	3--	603				
Bkry Co	6--	1008				
Sales Co	1--	178				
Sub Total	11265		1272			1272

Note: * To be included in Marine Field Depot Reinf.

MEDICAL UNITS

Med Bns	2--	930	1--461			1--461
Amb Co Mtz Sep	4--	372				
Clr Co (Sep)	1--	117				
Portable Surgical Hosp	4--	148				
✓ Evac Hosp (400 Bed)	3--	888				
Field Hosp(380 Bed)	4--	1008				
Med Lab	1--	58				
Sn Co	4--	468				
Med Dep Co	1--	178				
✓ Field Hosp (N) (600 Bed)	2--	700		1--	350*	
✓ Mbl Hosp (1500 Bed)	2--	1294		✓ 3--	1941	
Gen Hosp(1000 Bed)	4--	2568				
Sta Hosp(500 Bed)	2--	702				
Sta Hosp(250 Bed)	2--	384				
Med Storehouse (N)				1--	55	
Malaria Control Unit	4--	48		1--	12	
Optical Unit (N)				1--	3	
Malaria Surv Unit	4--	52				
Hq Med Serv	1--	120				
	7041	1994	461		2361	461

<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>FORMOSA</u>			<u>AMOY</u>		
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
<u>TRANSPORTATION UNITS</u>						
Ry Opng Bn	1-- 848					
Port Hq & Hq Co	1-- 519					
Port Bn (4 Cos each)	4--3600					
CB Special (F-1) (N)		1-- 944*			4--3776*	
Sub-total	4967	944			3776	
Note: * One CB Special (N) to operate with each Marine Amph. Corps Field Depot Reinf.						
<u>ENGINEER UNITS</u>						
Engr Hq	2-- 144					
Hq & Hq Co Engr Gp	7-- 595		1-- 84			1-- 84
Engr C Bn or Equiv	12--7968	4(CB's*)1--750 --4456			3 CB's* --3342	1--750
Topo Co	1-- 125		1--125			1--125
Topo Bn	1-- 445					
Water Sup Co	2-- 282					
Dep Co	2-- 388					
Dp Trk Co	8-- 912					
Hv Shop Co	2-- 356					
Hv Pon Bn	4--1584					
L Pon Co	8--1624					
Treadway Bridge Co	2-- 288					
Maint Co **	2-- 362					
Gen Cons:						
Cons Bn	10-9440	4--4456			5--5570	
Gen Serv Regt	1--1321					
AFld Cons:						
C.B.		6--6684			6-6684	

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TYPE OF UNIT	FORMOSA			AMOY		
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
<u>Engr Units Con't</u>						
Avn Engr Regt	3--8103					
Avn Engr Bn	2--1614					
Mbl SL Maint Plat	1-- 36					
Light Equipment Co	2-- 246					
Hq & Hq Co Base						
Dep Gp	1-- 75					
Petroleum Dist Co	1-- 228					
Base Equip Co	1-- 184					
Parts Sup Co	1-- 182					
Firefighting Plat	6-- 174					
Forestry Co	2-- 326					
Sub-total	37002	15596	959		15596	959

Note: * Navy CB's attached to each Marine Amph Corps as Corps Troops.
 ** Marine Engr Maint Co to be included Mar Field Depots Reinf.,
 in addition to other CB requirements.

<u>AVN SERV UNITS</u>						
Serv Gps	3--4680					
Dep Gps (Air)	1--2491					
Serv Gp (Spec) (VLR)	8--5960					
Dep Gp (Spec) (VLR)	2--2298					
Patsu		1--316			1--316	
AW Sqs (M)			3--690			2--460
Hq & Serv Sq (MAG)			4--2600			4--2600
Acorn (Less CB*) (Seaplane)		1--497			1--497	
Acorn (Less CB*) (Landplane)		1--503			1--503	
Casu		2--840			1--420	
AACS Det (includes 7 towers)	1-- 87					

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<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>	<u>FORMOSA</u>			<u>AMOY</u>		
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
<u>Avn Serv Units (Con't)</u>						
AACS Det				1--32		
Sig Co Avn	1--181					
Sig Cons Co Avn	1--228					
Sig Co Wg (VLR)	2--356					
Sig Co Serv Gp Spec (VLR)	8-3328					
Sig Co Serv Gp	2--200					
Sig Co Dep Avn (VLR)	2--904					
Sig Co Dep Avn (VBH -VBM)	1--226					
Sub-total	20939	2156	3290	1768		3060

Note: * CB's of Acorns and Cubs included in CB's listed under Engr Units.

SPECIAL UNITS

MP Bn	1--566					
MP Co	1--197		1--101			1--101
LVT(C) Bn *	10--4970					9--4284
LVT(Tk) Bn *	2--1554		1--846			1--846
DUKW Co (Amph Trk Co)**	12--2208			6--1104		
Base Post Office	1-- 98					
Base Censorship Det	1--136					
Field Dep <u>Reinf</u> Mar			1--3000			1--3000
Mar Serv Comd Gp			1-- 98			
Mar Air Delivery Sec			2-- 172			
Hq & Hq Co Serv Comd	1--335					
Sub-total	10064		4217	1104		8231

Note: * Shown in recapitulation as part of Expeditionary Force and Corps Trs.

** Shown in recapitulation as part of Service and Construction Units.

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TYPE OF UNIT	FORMOSA			AMOY		
	Army	Navy	Marine	Army	Navy	Marine
<u>CHEMICAL WARFARE UNITS</u> (Included in Special Units in recapitulation)						
Decon Co	1--170					
Lab Co	1-- 59					
Smoke Gener Co	2--270			2--270		
Maint Co	1--123					
Dep Co	1--184					
Cml Processing Co	1--146			1--146		
Sub-total	952			416		
<u>ADDITIONAL NAVAL UNITS</u>						
Gropac		1--1100				
Standard PT Unit		1-- 282			1--282	
Material Recovery Unit		1-- 25			1-- 25	
Standard Landing Craft Unit		3--1320				
Communication Unit Navy		3-- 381			5--1069	
Cub (Less CB's*)		1--1692				
Lion (Less CB's*)					1--3853	
P-8, Port Devel Unit		(1-includ. in Cub)			(1-includ. in Lion)	
Naval Supply Depot					(1-includ. in Lion)	
Sub-total		4800			5229	

Note: * CB's in Cubs and Lions included in CB's listed under Engr Units.

RECAPITULATION

<u>TROOPS</u>	<u>FORMOSA</u>			<u>AMOY</u>		
	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>
Expeditionary Force and Corps Troops (non-divisional)	41107		10844	1266	350	19291
Divisions	56952		36288			54432
Service and Con- struction	90200	20690	5982	1104	23501	5752
Tactical Air Force Units	26328	810	4909			5429
Special Units	2284		3371	416		3101
Additional Naval Units		4800			5229	
TOTAL	216,871	26,300	61,394	2,786	29,080	88,005

TOTAL AREA: FORMOSA - 304,565

AMOY - 119,871

GRAND TOTAL: CAUSEWAY - 424,436

~~TOP SECRET~~

CAUSEWAY
APPENDIX F
BASE DEVELOPMENT

1. PORTS TO BE DEVELOPED.

Phase I. Develop TAKAO to the extent necessary to accommodate shipping required to lift major elements of garrison forces and support assault and garrison forces, and development contemplated in the area. It is estimated that accommodations for approximately 75 cargo and troop ships per month will be required with a maximum monthly tonnage of 500,000.

Phase II. Develop port facilities at AMOY to the extent required to provide logistic support for the fleet and occupation forces.

2. NAVAL BASES AND FLEET ANCHORAGES.

Phase 1. Develop TAKAO HARBOR for minor naval base facilities and for harbor defense and control.

Phase 1a. Develop AMOY as a major fleet base, the equivalent of one Lion.

No fleet anchorages other than the bases at TAKAO and AMOY.

Size of forces to be accommodated:

TAKAO: 30 DD or DE; 18 PC or SC; 24 PT; 2 AD; 1 ARD;
1 AV; 2 AVP; 10 LST; 1 ARB; 4 AM; 3 AN; 2 AT;
1 ARL; 12 YMS; 6 LCI.

AMOY: 16 CV or CVL; 16 CVE; 8 BB; 16 CA or CL; 54 DD;
18 PC or SC; 24 PT; 2 AD; 2 AR; 1 AV; 2 AVP;
10 LST; 1 ARB; 4 AM; 3 AN; 2 AT; 1 AGP; 1 ARL;
12 YMS; 6 LCI.

Missions.

TAKAO: To support patrol units for local defense and for the control of FORMOSA and LUZON STRAITS.

AMOY: To support a major Carrier Task Force.

Both bases to be developed for use only for the duration of the war.

Repair facilities should be floating to the maximum degree; shore repair facilities should be of a temporary nature.

3. NUMBER OF SEAPLANE BASES - NUMBER OF SQUADRONS.

Phase I. Activate TOKO seaplane base (22-27N, 120-27E) to accommodate two (2) PB(MS) for permanent operations.

Install facilities for accommodation one squadron PB(HS) for hospital evacuation and rescue missions.

Phase II. Develop seaplane facilities at AMOY HARBOR on KULANGSU or AMOY ISLAND, to accommodate one squadron PB(MS) and one squadron PB(HS).

4. ARMY, MARINE, AND NAVY AIRFIELDS.

Priority of Airfield development in order as listed.

a. Phase I.

(1) Develop initially three fighter fields (Marine) to accommodate three groups VMF, plus 3 squadrons VMF(night), each field to accommodate:

1 Hq & SS (Marine)

1 Sig. A.W. Co, including night fighter direction

3 Sqs VMF - 81 VMF

1 Sq VMF(N) - 12 VMF(N)

(2) Construct or activate as soon as practicable after activation of fighter fields, one Navy and one Marine Field to accommodate:

Navy Field

2 Casu

4 Sqs PB(HL) for long range search 48 PB(HL)

1 Sq VD Navy 6 VD(Navy)

Marine Field

1 Hq & SS Marine

1 Group, 4 Sqs, VMSB or VMTB

✓ 72 VMSB/VMTB

4 Sqs VMR

✓ 52 VMR(Marine)

(3) Provide tender based facilities as soon as practicable for:

2 Sqs PB(MS)

24 PB(MS)

(4) Construct or activate one Army field to accommodate:

1 Service Squadron

1 Group (4 Sqs) VEM (Army)

64 ✓ VEM(Army)

(5) Construct two Army fields, each to accommodate

1 Service Squadron

1 Group (4 Sqs) VBH (Army)

96 ✓ VBH (Army)

First field to be completed in 30 days; second field in 45 days.

(6) Construct four VLR fields, each field to accommodate two groups VLR (30 VLR per group)

240 VLR ✓

To be completed in 90 to 150 days.

(7) Construct or activate seaplane facilities at TOKO to accommodate 2 squadrons PB(MS) for search operations, and as soon thereafter as practicable, accommodations for one squadron PB(HS) for evacuation of wounded and for rescue purposes -

2 Sq. PB(MS)

24 PB(MS)

1 Sq. PB(HS)

12 PB(HS)

(8) Summary - Phase I (Southwestern FORMOSA)

AIRCRAFT

<u>Fields</u>	<u>Sqdns & Serv.Units</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	<u>Desired Operational Date</u>
3 Ftr-Marine	9 VMF 3 VMF(N) 3 Hq & SS(Mar) 2 Sig A.W. Co dir.comp		3 {	243 VMF 36 VMF(N)	D / 15

<u>Fields</u>	<u>Sqdns & Serv.Units</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>			<u>Desired Operational Date</u>
		<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Marine</u>	
1 Navy	4 PB(H) 1 VD(N) 2 Casu		48 PB(HL) 3P 6 VD		D / 25
1 Marine	4 VMSB/✓ VMTB 4 VMR ✓ 1 Hq & SS (Mar)			72 VMSB/✓ VMTB 52 VMR 403	D / 25
Tender Base	2 PB(MS) 1 PB(HS)		24 PB(MS) 12 PB(HS)		D / 25
1. Army	4 VBM(A) ✓ 1 Ser Sq	64 VBM			D / 25
2 Army	8 VBH(A) ✓ 2 Ser Sq	96 VBH			D / 30, D / 45
4 VLR	24 VLR ✓	240 VLR	(8 Gp)		D / 90 to D / 150 D / 90
Seaplane base -					
12 Fields, Aircraft: 400(Army), 90 (Navy), 403 (Marine)					

(9) Available information indicates that there are in operation at the present time in "Phase I Area" the following Japanese airfields:

3 major fields:

TINANSHO airport (22-57N, 120-12 E)

OKOYAMA airport (22-48N, 120-16 E)

HEITO airport (22-40N, 120-27 E)

1 major seaplane base at TOKO (22-27N, 120-27 E)

6 minor airfields

b. Phase II.

Development of airfields and seaplane facilities in AMOY area.

(1) Two fields, each to accommodate:

1 Hq & SS (Marine)

1 Sig. A. W. Co. including night fighter direction component

3 Sq VMF

- 81 VMF, each field

1 Sq VMF(N)

- 12 VMF(N) " "

2

(2) One field to be constructed to accommodate:

1 Hq & S- (Marine)

4 Sq VMSB or VMTB

- 72 VMSB/VMTB

X 1 Sq VMD

- 12 VMD

(3) One field to accommodate:

1 Hq & SS (Marine)

4 Sq VBM (Marine)

- 60 VBM (Marine)

(4) Development of seaplane facilities on KULANGSU

ISLAND or AMOY ISLAND to accommodate:

1 Sq PB(MS)

Planes from permanent base at

1 Sq PB(HS)

TOKO operate from this base

as required.

(5) One field to be constructed after completion of other more urgently required fields, for two carrier (CV) air groups to accommodate:

1 Casu

1 Sig. A. W. or Argus

X 72 VF

72 VSB

76 VTB

(6) Summary - Phase II (AMOY area)

Fields	Sgdn & Serv. Units	AIRCRAFT			Desired Operational Date
		Army	Navy	Marine	
2 Ftr Marine	6 VMF 2 VMF(N) 2 Hq & SS(Mar) 2 Sig AW CO, dir. Comp.		2 { 162 VMF 24 VMF(N)		W / 15
1 Marine	4 VMSB/ VMTB 1 VMD 1 Hq & SS(Mar)		1 { 72 VMSB/ VMTB 12 VMD		W / 20
1 VBM	4 VBM 1 Hq & SS(Mar)		1 60 VBM		W / 25
Seapl. base	1 PB(MS) 1 PB(HS)				
1 Navy - for 2 CVAG	1 Casu 1 Sig. AW Co.				W / 60
TOTAL: 4 fields - 310 Marine					

(7) Available information indicates that there are in operation within the area of occupation at the present time, two airfields on the Island of AMOY and possibly one field on QUEMOY.

c. Summary Army, Navy, Marine Airfields.

Phase I.

Army - 7 including 4 VLR, 2 VBH, 1 VBM

Navy - 1 for PB(HL), 1 seaplane base

Marine - 4, including 3 VF and 1 VMSB/VMTB

Phase II.

Army - none

Navy - 1 seaplane base, 1 field for 2 carrier (CV) air groups

Marine - 4, including 2 VF, 1 VMSB/VMTB, 1 VBM(M)

d. Summary Number Aircraft.

NAVY:	Patrol, heavy landplane	48✓
	Patrol, heavy seaplane	14
	Patrol, medium seaplane	24
	Photographic	6✓
MARINE:	Fighters	405
	Night fighters	48✓
	Medium bombers	60
	Dive bombers	72✓
	Torpedo bombers	72✓
	Photographic	12✓
ARMY:	Medium bombers	64✓
	Heavy bombers	96✓
	Very heavy bombers	240 ✓
GRAND TOTAL Army, Navy, and Marine Aircraft		1174